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INTRODUCTION
Democracies can function without judicial review. Deliberation by
elected legislators is more reliable and more legitimate in solving problems
and accommodating groups than deliberation by unelected judges.' Under
what circumstances, if any, can aggressive judicial review be defended?
The traditional answer has been that judges enforcing our popularly ratified
social contract (the Constitution) are not acting undemocratically.2 But key
constitutional provisions are open textured. Due process of law, equal
protection, and freedom of speech are not determinate commands; their
breadth and ambiguity assure judicial discretion.
The activism of the Warren Court (1953-1969) rendered this theoretical
quandary politically urgent. If the Justices were simply imposing their own
liberal values onto these open-textured clauses, why should Southern states,
police departments, and state legislatures respect Warren Court decrees that
invalidated settled practices and local customs? Academics searched for a
theory that would resolve the tension between activist review and
democracy. The most successful was the representation reinforcement
theory developed by John Hart Ely in Democracy and Distrust.
3
Ely's project was an elaboration and defense of footnote four of United
States v. Carolene Products Co.4 Upholding an economic regulation,
Carolene Products described circumstances where the strong "presumption
of constitutionality" may not hold: (1) laws violating the clear commands of
a "specific prohibition" in the Constitution, such as the Bill of Rights;
(2) laws restricting "those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation"; and (3) laws
"directed at particular religious or national or racial minorities" or reflecting
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities. 5 Judges should
aggressively review such laws, Ely maintained, to ensure that the
preconditions for the proper operation of democracy are in place: (1) the
rule of law, (2) formal access to democratic processes, and (3) adequate
representation.6
The representation reinforcement formula explained the Warren Court's
jurisprudence as an effort to correct entrenched race-based democracy
deficits. Under Ely's interpretation, that Court was not a bunch of result-
1. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 212-13, 267-68 (1999) (arguing
against judicial review altogether); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893) (urging deferential judicial review).
2. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
3. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
4. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
5. Id. (citations omitted).
6. ELY, supra note 3, at 73-77, 87-103.
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oriented liberals; it was a serious group of jurists dedicated to assuring
neutral rules for the operation of America's democracy. The Court was a
process-enforcing referee, not a superlegislature.7 And this is the role
suggested by the structure of the Constitution itself. The Constitution's
premise is democracy: All adults must have the right to vote and to engage
in expressive activities; freely elected legislators are accountable to We the
People and open to criticism; and legislatures cannot indulge in class
legislation, censorship, an established church, or other activities that
undermine the conditions for robust democracy.8 After reading the book,
you want to believe that the theory was inherent in the Constitution. The
social contract's rule of law coincides with justice and the civil rights
revolution of the twentieth century. This is compelling stuff.
But Ely's theory provided a much better defense of judicial activism in
the Warren Court's race cases than in the post-1969 sex, sexual orientation,
and race cases. The newer cases expose the representation reinforcement
model to charges that it understates the substantive commitments of the
Constitution and lacks a political theory of democracy that courts ought to
be "perfecting." These problems suggest that the theory is indeterminate,
thereby deepening rather than solving the problem of unguided judicial
activism.9 Part I of this article explores these criticisms in the context of the
post-1969 cases.
The post-1969 cases not only reveal that Ely's theory does not work as
a descriptive matter but also suggest that it is incomplete as a prescriptive
matter. Part II outlines an understanding of the multicultural-pluralist
democracy suggested by our experience with social movements such as the
civil rights, women's rights, gay rights, and traditional family values
movements. Under this conception of our democracy as multicultural and
pluralist, Ely was right to criticize judicial review that hardwires a woman's
near-absolute right to choose abortion into the Constitution. Contrary to
Ely, lenient judicial review of sodomy laws illustrates equally misguided
judicial passivity. What makes both lines of cases problematic is that the
Supreme Court burdened American democracy by raising the stakes of
politics. In its early abortion cases, the Court raised the political stakes by
prematurely removing a fundamental and hard-to-resolve issue from
ordinary politics. Suggesting that homosexuality might be a demonized
status because of its tie to illegal conduct, the Court's sodomy jurisprudence
7. Id. at 73-75.
8. Id. at 88-100. But see Michael C. Dorf, The Coherentism of Democracy and Distrust,
114 YALE L.J. 1237 (2005) (critiquing the assumption that the premise of the Constitution is
democracy).
9. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart
Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
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raised the stakes by denying a group of citizens the protection of a neutral
rule of law. Both lines of cases yielded immediate and longstanding
political turmoil, and the Court has backed away from both.
Conversely, as Ely argued, a cautious judicial review can contribute
positively to the democracy project. Part II suggests conditions under which
judicial review can facilitate the operation of our pluralist democracy by
lowering the stakes of politics. First, judges can encourage all groups to
participate by assuring that neutral rules of an open political system are
vigorously enforced. (This is a pluralism-facilitating justification for the
first Carolene Products prong.) Second, judges can ameliorate politically
destructive culture wars by denying groups state assistance in their efforts
to exclude, demonize, or harm groups they dislike and by channeling
intergroup politics away from appeals to prejudice and stereotypes. (This is
a pluralism-facilitating extension of the second and third Carolene Products
prongs.) Third, judges can help integrate successful new identity groups
into the political process by clearing away obsolete laws that discriminate
against these new partners assimilated into our multicultural pluralism.
(This goes beyond the Carolene Products framework.)
Part III applies the foregoing model of pluralism-facilitating judicial
review to several topics of current and future constitutional interest: the role
of courts in monitoring the war on terror, state discriminations against
language minorities, and state and federal bars to same-sex marriage. The
pluralism-facilitating model addresses the concerns of women, pro-life
persons, language minorities, and lesbians and gay men, but with
procedural twists to avoid judicial stakes raising. For contentious issues that
roil the nation, the Supreme Court should not impose national resolutions
and should instead rely on dialogic techniques that essentially remand to the
democratic process and leave it room to elaborate or respond. Introduced in
Section II.C and applied in Part III, these techniques include avoidance of
tough constitutional issues through procedural dodges (the passive virtues)
or narrow statutory interpretations; incremental, case-by-case development
of new constitutional principles; and use of constitutional doctrines such as
void-for-vagueness and as-applied challenges, which allow the political
process to respond.
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I. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
REPRESENTATION REINFORCEMENT THEORY
During the 1964 Term, John Hart Ely clerked for Chief Justice Warren,
whom he idolized. 0 Ely recognized that the Warren Court was activist, but
in the service of process and not values.1 Defending such a process-serving
activism, Democracy and Distrust laid out a constitutionally justified recipe
for filling in the "open texture" of the Free Speech, Due Process, and Equal
Protection Clauses. These provisions should be read most aggressively
when, legislative majorities lock out minorities from political power or
adopt policies reflecting social prejudice. Thus, the Warren Court was
legally (not just morally) right to protect religious minorities against
compelled school prayers, 2 to require reapportionment and opening up of
the franchise,' 3 to protect minority and political associations and public
expression from censorship,1 4 and to insist on procedural protections for
Latino and African-American defendants frequently railroaded through a
white-dominated criminal justice system.1 5
What originally struck law professors as the Court's most virtuous but
least lawful decision, Brown v. Board ofEducation,16 was legally defensible
once you understood the Constitution the way Ely did. His theory suggested
two process-based defenses of Brown I that complemented--or avoided-
justice-based objections to apartheid. The political process that yielded
segregated public schools was not one where democracy-justified deference
was appropriate, because people of color (the objects of segregation) were
formally excluded from the democratic process in the South and because
they were a discrete and insular minority who were marginalized even
where they could formally participate (as in Topeka).1 7 Indeed, segregated
education was a mechanism for ensuring the continuing marginalization of
10. Democracy and Distrust was dedicated, "For Earl Warren. You don't need many heroes
if you choose carefully." ELY, supra note 3, at v.
11. See id. at 73-75; John Hart Ely, The Chief, 88 HARV. L. REV. 11, 12 (1974).
12. ELY, supra note 3, at 100; see G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 338,
346 (1982) (reading the school prayer decisions as reactions to defects in the political process).
13. ELY, supra note 3, at 116-25 (criticizing some of the Court's reasoning but fully agreeing
with the outcome of the reapportionment cases).
14. Id. at 113-16; see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062, 2334-40
(2002).
15. ELY, supra note 3, at 172-73; see Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to
Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REv. 747, 763-68 (1991) (expanding on and strengthening
Ely's defense of the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions).
16. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17. See ELY, supra note 3, at 136-40, 160-61 (defending the anti-apartheid decisions under
the antiprejudice prong of Carolene Products); Klarman, supra note 15, at 788-819 (defending the
decisions under the access prong).
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minorities, because it inculcated racist stereotypes and prejudices in the
minds of children.18
Its defense of the racial segregation decisions explains much of the
acclaim academics have given to representation reinforcement theory. But
Ely's theory has been at odds with the constitutional activism of the post-
1969 Court.' 9 This phenomenon was partly a consequence of the Warren
Court's success. After the Court and the Johnson Administration dismantled
formal apartheid, purged the South of prejudice-dominated trials, and
opened up the political process to minority voices and votes, the operation
of democracy actually improved. At that point, it was not clear what more a
referee Court should do. The Warren Court's success, however, ensured
that there would be ongoing pressure on the Court to engage in activist
review. The NAACP's Inc. Fund and its allies (such as the ACLU) were
emboldened by their earlier triumphs and pressed for new ones. Other
social movements copied and expanded on the Inc. Fund model to press
their own causes upon the Court.2 °
Although the Burger and Rehnquist Courts were staffed with strict
constructionists, they proved no less activist than the Warren Court. Their
activism was responsive to constitutional litigation campaigns conducted by
various women's rights movements, the gay rights movement, and
traditional values countermovements-all following the pattern of the civil
rights movement.2 But their activism had no firmer support in original
constitutional meaning. And unlike pre-1969 civil rights decisions, many of
the identity politics decisions after 1969 can be criticized from a
representation reinforcement perspective.
A. Women's Rights
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court's constitutionalization of women's
rights went well beyond representation-reinforcing justifications. Feminists
demanded that women have the right to choose abortions for unwanted
pregnancies, and the Court accommodated their demands in Roe v. Wade.22
Feminists demanded invalidation of state discriminations based on sex, and
18. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493-94 & n.11.
19. See, e.g., Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087,
1090-91 (1982) (expressing doubt that the principles of footnote four should be broadly applied).
20. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET 97-101, 125-37 (1999) (gay rights); Serena Mayeri, Note, "A Common Fate of
Discrimination": Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J.
1045 (2001) (women's rights).
21. For an overview of the influence that constitutional litigation campaigns had on the
evolution of constitutional jurisprudence, see Eskridge, supra note 14, at 2194-353.
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2005] 1285
HeinOnline  -- 114 Yale L.J. 1285 2004-2005
The Yale Law Journal
the Court accommodated them, striking down archaic sex discriminations in
Reed v. Reed23 and announcing a standard of quasi-strict scrutiny for all
sex-based classifications in Craig v. Boren.
24
Such aggressive review finds little support in the Carolene Products
framework. (1) There is no constitutional provision, apart from the
Nineteenth Amendment (applicable just to voting), that specifically
guarantees women's rights, and the history of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides little support for abortion rights or heightened scrutiny of sex-
based classifications.25 (2) Since 1920, women have had formal access to
the political process. There have been few state efforts to interfere with
women's exercise of the franchise, political activity on behalf of their
causes, or publication of their books and literature. (3) Women are neither
insular nor a minority of the population. They are usually a voting majority,
and there is no procedural reason why the political process should not take
account of their interests.26
Indeed, the democratic process was hard at work when the Court struck
down abortion laws and sex-based classifications. Between 1964 and 1976,
Congress enacted statutes protecting against sex discrimination in the
workplace and educational institutions and adopted the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA),27 while some state legislatures initiated the process by
which old abortion restrictions were rethought and most sex-based
classifications were purged from their codes.28 Although feminist projects
did not always prevail in the democratic process, they lost only when
women as well as men opposed them.29 Ely thus criticized the abortion and
sex discrimination jurisprudence: It would be more legitimate for women's
rights reforms to win in the legislative rather than the judicial process.3°
Ely's critique of Roe has proven particularly cogent, because that
decision contributed to both the flourishing and the radicalization of the
23. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
24. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
25. But cf Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2001) (arguing for a more expansive reading
of the Nineteenth Amendment).
26. See ELY, supra note 3, at 164-69.
27. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973) (plurality opinion).
28. See ROSEMARY NOSSIFF, BEFORE ROE: ABORTION POLICY IN THE STATES 3 (2001).
29. See, e.g., JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 6, 15 (1986) (arguing that the
ERA failed in part because many women were lukewarm or opposed to it).
30. ELY, supra note 3, at 164-70 (arguing that Carolene Products's third prong does not
justify heightened scrutiny of sex-based classifications, except perhaps for laws adopted before
1920); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
935-36 (1973) (arguing that the decision whether to protect a woman's right to an abortion is a
substantive value judgment for which there is no constitutional basis).
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pro-life movement. 31 Without generating as much controversy, the Court's
sex discrimination jurisprudence may have been even more harmful from
an Elysian32 perspective. In Craig, the Court gave the women's rights
movement pretty much the same constitutional results that the failing ERA
would have.33 Not only was the ERA proof that women were not excluded
from the democratic process, but Craig was a judicial signal to other social
movements that the Article V process was no longer necessary for
constitutional change, even for groups (like women) that had used it
successfully in the past. It took two generations of sustained feminist
activism to win the right to vote assured by the Nineteenth Amendment, but
in less than a decade feminists had won a larger victory through the votes of
six Justices.
After Roe, an invigorated pro-life movement expressed itself through
direct contact with women seeking abortions. Judges limited the
movement's advocacy through injunctions against speech outside abortion
clinics. In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, the Court ruled that such
injunctions must burden no more speech than necessary to serve a
significant government interest in protecting patients and health care
personnel against harassment. 34 Under this standard, the Court upheld a 36-
foot buffer zone in front of the clinic but struck down bars to displaying
images outside the clinic and to approaching patients within 300 feet of the
clinic. Hill v. Colorado upheld a statute barring anyone within 100 feet of a
health care facility from approaching another person to hand out leaflets or
engage in conversation.35 Ely's theory suggests skepticism of such stringent
state regulation of a minority group's effort to present its perspective in
public spaces. Echoing Ely, Justice Scalia's dissent charged that Hill was a
classic case for judicial intervention, because the "ins" (pro-choice forces)
were choking off protest from the "outs" (pro-life forces, who were
precluded from legislative expression because of Roe).36 In Madsen, judges
were authors of the out-group censorship, which was maybe worse. In
neither case did the Court bother to respond to Scalia's representation-
reinforcing objections.
31. See, e.g., DALLAS A. BLANCHARD, THE ANTI-ABORTION MOVEMENT AND THE RISE OF
THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT: FROM POLITE TO FIERY PROTEST 22-36, 44-46 (1994) (providing an
institutional history of the pro-life movement and sketching its anti-Roe ideology).
32. See JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 465 n.117 (1996) (expressing a
preference for "Elysian" as the adjectival form of his name).
33. MANSBR1DGE, supra note 29, at 46.
34. 512 U.S. 753 (1994); see also Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357
(1997) (applying Madsen).
35. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
36. Id. at 762-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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B. White People's Rights
Although its Justices struck down some state programs benefiting racial
minorities, the Burger Court never achieved a majority position for
constitutional evaluation of "benign" race-based preferences. It was the
Rehnquist Court, ruling in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.37 and
Adarand Constructors v. Pena,38  that first subjected government-
contracting programs helping racial minorities to strict scrutiny to satisfy
the Equal Protection Clause. 39 The University of Michigan decisions,
Grutter v. Bollinger4° and Gratz v. Bollinger,41 assure that judges will
preside over line drawing by colleges and universities seeking diverse
student populations.
Ely rejected aggressive judicial review of "reverse discrimination."
There is no clear constitutional bar to it, and the Equal Protection Clause
should be reserved for those cases where majorities are suppressing
minorities-and not where majorities are remedying minority
underrepresentation.42 Ely was aware of Alexander Bickel's argument that
affirmative action reinforces negative stereotypes about people of color
43
but believed that Bickel was making the same kind of mistake that had been
made in Roe-importing substantive values into the Constitution. So long
as all sides have a fair opportunity to participate, the affirmative action
debate should be left to the political process. Judges have neither the
competence nor the legitimacy to make judgments that are essentially
political choices.
37. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to state and local affirmative action plans
but suggesting that federal plans might be evaluated more leniently).
38. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to federal affirmative action plans and
overruling Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
39. Croson contained an indirect bow to Ely. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion suggested
that race-based affirmative action would be more acceptable from the federal government, whose
handling of race issues inspired greater trust among the Framers (perhaps in part because
Congress represents a more diverse constituency). See Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-98 (opinion of
O'Connor, J.). The concession was retracted in Adarand, which struck down a federal program.
See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 251-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the law school's deployment of race as a flexible plus
factor, following Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.)).
41. 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down the college's deployment of race as a factor providing
a determinate number of points in a more mechanical admissions process).
42. ELY, supra note 3, at 170-72; John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial
Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 723 (1974); see Adarand, 515 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (making Ely's argument for lenient review of minority-assisting preferences).
43. Brief of Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Jurisdictional Statement or in the Alternative Petition for Certiorari at 24-25, DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (No. 73-235).
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Yet Ely endorsed Shaw v. Reno, where the Court followed Croson to
rule that racial gerrymandering engineered to increase minority
representation in the legislature is subject to strict scrutiny.44 Ely himself
saw state creation of majority-black districts as no different from political
gerrymandering, the effort typically designed to entrench incumbents and
established power alignments.45 But Elysian theory supports Justice
Stevens's Shaw dissent, which objected to the application of anti-apartheid
precedents when a white majority was opening up the political process to
minority representation.46 As Pam Karlan puts it, the Shaw cases reveal a
tension between the free-access and minority-protection prongs of Carolene
Products, because "the protection of minority interests is now often best
served not by judicial scrutiny of legislative outcomes but by judicial
deference to plans that allocate power to politicians elected from minority
communities."47
C. Gay Rights-and Beyond
Representation reinforcement theory, as Ely presented it, is ambivalent
about gay rights. Like people of color, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgendered (LGBT) people have been brutalized by the criminal justice
system, censored by the state, and excluded from governmental benefits and
obligations because of prejudice. These state policies pushed gays into the
dispersed anonymity of the closet, leaving them politically defenseless as
well as unable to refute stereotypes and prejudice by openly engaging with
other Americans. 48 On the other hand, Ely felt that laws founded on a
"sincerely held moral objection" to sodomy, and not reflecting "a simple
desire to injure the parties involved," are substantive and beyond judicial
review.49
Given this framework, it is not completely clear how representation
reinforcement theory should decide Romer v. Evans.5 0 Gay people in
Colorado are concentrated in Denver, Aspen, and Boulder; each city
44. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
45. John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L. REV. 607
(1998) (criticizing political gerrymanders, which Ely took to include race-based gerrymanders);
see also John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie: Are Racial Stereotypes Now Acceptable Across
the Board or Only When Used in Support of Partisan Gerrymanders?, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489
(2002) (criticizing the Court's upholding of a majority-black district).
46. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 678 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (making this representation-reinforcing
point); accord Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 947-48 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
47. Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in
Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329, 1331 (2005).
48. ELY, supra note 3, at 162-64.
49. Id. at 255 n.92.
50. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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adopted ordinances protecting against sexual orientation discrimination.
The state as a whole is homo anxious, and in 1992 its voters amended the
state constitution to preempt government policies protecting gay people
against discrimination. Ely agreed with the Court that the initiative swept
too broadly and seemed to deprive gay people as a class of a wide range of
legal protections ordinary citizens take for granted. 51 But the dissent also
made a representation-reinforcing point: that "tolerant Coloradans" had
been among the first to repeal their state sodomy law but felt that
ordinances affirmatively protecting "homosexuals" against private
discrimination promoted homosexuality and sodomy, contrary to their
tolerant moral code.
52
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court (shortly before Ely's death) struck
down Texas's Homosexual Conduct Law.53 Because the law made only
"homosexual" and not heterosexual sodomy illegal, Ely would have
objected to it. From a representation-reinforcing perspective, "there is no
more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable
government than to require that the principles of law which officials would
impose upon a minority must be imposed generally., 54 But only Justice
O'Connor followed this reasoning.55 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
invalidated all consensual sodomy laws as a violation of the liberty
guarantee of the Due Process Clause. 56 Ely would presumably have had
some sympathy for Justice Scalia's complaint, in dissent, that the
Constitution is not committed to substantive protection of sexual liberty
against government regulation and that sodomy reform is a matter of moral
judgment better left to state political processes.57
51. The "Scholars' Brief," which Ely joined, made an argument similar to the one the Court
eventually made. Compare id. at 630-35, with Brief of Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald
Gunther, Philip B. Kurland, and Kathleen M. Sullivan, as Amici Curiae, Romer (No. 94-1039).
Ely might have made the stronger point that antidiscrimination laws are particularly important to
assure public space for openly gay people.
52. Romer, 517 U.S. at 644-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (mobilizing the distinction, also drawn
by Ely, between morals-based regulation of acts and animus-based discrimination against classes
of people).
53. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
54. Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
55. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
56. Id. at 574-79 (majority opinion).
57. Id. at 602-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Ely would have appreciated the difficulties LGBT
people face in the political process, but by 2003 most states had in fact repealed their consensual
sodomy laws. Even in Texas, "homosexual sodomy" was just a Class C misdemeanor for which a
$500 fine was the maximum punishment. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 2003). In
other venues where legislatures had left sodomy a crime, state judges (accountable to voters) had
invalidated those laws. E.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002); Powell v. State, 510
S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
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Representation reinforcement theory also raises questions about the
Court's decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.58 Applying a state law
barring sexual orientation discrimination by public accommodations, state
courts ruled that the Boy Scouts could not categorically exclude gay men
from being scoutmasters. The Supreme Court overruled this application as
inconsistent with the First Amendment's protection of free association and
speech. Ely would have been skeptical, because the Boy Scouts' antigay
"expression" was found mostly in the briefs filed by their lawyers and
because the law reflected no tendency of political insiders to suppress
outsiders. As in the affirmative action cases, the disputed law was adopted
by a legislature filled with straight people and presumably reflected an
unprejudiced judgment about the social dangers of homophobia. 59 To the
extent they felt otherwise, the Boy Scouts and their allies were amply
represented in the state and national political process. The same could be
said for Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of
Boston, where the Court invalidated the application of Massachusetts's
antidiscrimination law to the Boston St. Patrick's Day parade, which
excluded openly gay marching groups.6 °
As Dan Ortiz has argued, the gay rights cases illustrate the
impossibility of avoiding substantive judgments in constitutional
decisionmaking. 61 In cases like Romer and Lawrence, the difference
between antigay prejudice, which Ely would have judges monitor, and
traditional morality, which he would not, is a substantive judgment. So even
Ely's theory requires assessment of values. Indeed, one can easily conclude
that the Constitution does as well.62 Its great structural innovations
(federalism, separation of powers, a Bill of Rights) were advanced to
subserve liberty. And the document is chock full of provisions directly
protecting liberty.6 3 Taking substance (liberty) out of the Constitution, or
relegating it to the shadows as Ely does, is like taking God out of the Bible.
Partly for these reasons, libertarian principles explain the Rehnquist Court's
58. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
59. Thus, Ely would have followed the Court in rejecting First Amendment attacks on the
application of antidiscrimination laws to all-male social clubs. E.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984). That the Court allowed the states to integrate women into social clubs but
not gay people into parades and Scout troops would have struck Ely as backwards, given the
continued political marginalization of gay people.
60. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
61. Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process Theory,
77 VA. L. REv. 721 (1991).
62. E.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
63. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1 (Contracts Clause); id. amend. I (Speech, Press, and
Religion Clauses); id. amend. V (Takings Clause); id. amend. XIII (antislavery); id. amend. XIV
(Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses).
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jurisprudence-cases like Lawrence, Dale, Hurley, Casey, Adarand, and
Gratz-much better than representation reinforcement theory does.
Consider a further problem with representation reinforcement theory
that the gay rights cases, in particular, highlight. Ely assumed that
democracy needs enhancing only when people are formally locked out of
its processes (Carolene Products prong two) and that representation needs
reinforcing only when prejudice is operating against discrete and insular
minorities (Carolene Products prong three). Formal exclusion and open
appeals to prejudice were urgent problems posed by the race cases, but the
women's rights and gay rights cases suggest that representation
reinforcement might be understood more functionally. 64 Democracy is less
than perfect when out-group citizens have significant disadvantages in
exercising political power as a practical matter (Romer and Lawrence),
when the state interferes with the political activities of morality-based as
well as minority groups (Hill and Dale), or when obsolete laws are
perpetuated because of inertia and tradition more than affirmative public
support (Roe and Reed). Representation may be defective not only because
of prejudice against minorities (Romer) but also because of stereotypes
regarding women or minorities (Craig and Adarand).65
Functional theories of democracy and representation better explain the
Burger and Rehnquist Court cases, but they have a normative problem.
Ely's more formalist theory is tied to the Constitution, which is premised on
the operation of a democratic process in which all adult citizens have an
opportunity to participate and in which there are no permanent out-caste
66groups of citizens. Functional theories of democracy and representation
less easily tied to the Constitution might be less legitimate. Moreover,
judges may be able to apply Ely's formal approach more objectively and
predictably than they could apply a more functionalist approach. If this is
so, functionally grounded judicial review will be more manipulable and
vulnerable to the countermajoritarian difficulty. Nevertheless, Ely's theory
cannot be uncontroversially applied to the sex, sexual orientation, and race
cases confronted by the Court since 1969.
64. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1985)
(arguing from a public choice theory of politics in favor of aggressive judicial review of laws
discriminating against gays and poor people).
65. See ELY, supra note 3, at 155-64 (recognizing the disabling role of stereotypes).
66. Id. at 88-101.
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II. LOWERING THE STAKES OF POLITICS:
A THEORY OF PLURALISM-FACILITATING JUDICIAL REVIEW
Appreciating that American constitutional governance is democratic,
Ely did not deeply explore its pluralist dimensions. A pluralist political
system is one whose goal is the accommodation of the interests of as many
salient groups as possible, without disturbing the ability of the state and the
community to press forward with collective projects.67 In a pluralist
democracy, social, economic, and ideological groups compete for the
approval and support of representatives and the electorate. The polity, in
turn, encourages groups to participate in the marketplace of politics.
The twentieth century saw an evolution of American pluralism,
responsive to identity-based social movements. Those movements sought to
change public opinion about norms involving race, gender, sexual
orientation, and disability, and worked through the political process to
change the law. But those movements also reflected a multicultural
pluralism, in which an increasing array of groups or subgroups sought to
create their own quasi-autonomous communities within the larger culture.68
Although the Framers of the Constitution did not anticipate our modem
pluralism, they appreciated the fragility of democracy when the "stakes" of
politics get too high. Stakes get high when the system becomes embroiled
in bitter disputes that drive salient, productive groups away from
engagement in pluralist politics. 69 Groups will disengage when they believe
that participation in the system is pointless due to their permanent defeat on
issues important to them or their perception that the process is stacked
against them, or when the political process imposes fundamental burdens
on them or threatens their group identity or cohesion. At the Founding of
our nation, religion was the classic example of high-stakes politics; the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment sought to lower the stakes of
67. See ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND
CONSENT (1967); THEODORE J. LOwi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE
UNITED STATES 51 (2d ed. 1979) (describing "interest group liberalism"); Nicholas R. Miller,
Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SC. REV. 734 (1983).
68. See LANi GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994); WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A
LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995); STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST:
CIvic EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY (2000); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE
AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990).
69. My discussion of the "stakes" of politics draws from ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY
AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN
AMERICA 36-37 (1991). Because Przeworski focuses on protecting emerging democracies against
collapse, his use of the term is more conservative (don't rock the boat) than mine. Through the
prism of identity-based social movements, the challenge for democracy is to adapt to new interests
whose norms generate intense disagreement over time.
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religion-based politics. 70 Today, issues such as abortion and same-sex
marriage are the paradigm for high-stakes politics.
In an Elysian spirit, this Part develops a theory of pluralist democracy
and the dangers faced by such democracies. The Constitution suggests
principles for managing such dangers, what I call "pluralism-facilitating"
judicial review. An important directive, derived from both political science
and constitutional history, is that the stakes of politics need to be kept
reasonably low. Three constitutional mechanisms for keeping stakes low
are assuring each group that it has an equal opportunity in the polity,
ameliorating culture wars and channeling identity politics into positive
policies, and cleaning out normatively obsolescent laws. Such stakes-
lowering tactics help us understand the cases in Part I.
A. Pluralist Democracy and Its Discontents
Pluralist democracy is dynamic and fragile. It is dynamic because the
nature, composition, and balance of politically relevant groups shift over
time. It is fragile because it depends on the commitment of all politically
relevant groups to its processes. Political losers may exit the system unless
they think their interests will be accommodated or their losses from exiting
will exceed their gains.7' The exit problem is not mere theory. Democracies
fail all the time, including those generating prosperity for their citizens. The
birth of the United States is an example. In part because they were formally
unrepresented in Parliament, the thirteen colonies believed that their
interests were better served through independence from Great Britain-and
so they declared independence. Additionally, the more heterogeneous the
democracy, the greater its chances of failure.72 Our country is more
ethnically, religiously, and ideologically heterogeneous now than at any
previous time in its history-and that diversity is a source of potential
instability.
The possibility of exit and collapse is not, however, the only or even the
most important challenge. A pluralist democracy needs emerging groups to
commit to its processes just as much as it needs established groups to stick
to those processes. And there are positive reasons to encourage all groups-
new and old-to work within the democratic system. Any government
70. Cf STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 202-08, 222-27 (1995) (interpreting the Religion Clauses to support "gag rules"
keeping combustible issues off the public agenda).
71. PRZEWORSKI, supra note 69, at 26-37; Miller, supra note 67, at 742.
72. Although the most significant variable is low per capita income, Adam Przeworski, Why
Do Political Parties Obey Results of Elections?, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 114,
114-15 (Jos6 Maria Maravall & Adam Przeworski eds., 2003), cultural heterogeneity also,
assertedly, contributes to democratic instability, id. at 128.
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depends on the cooperation of citizens in the ordinary affairs of governance.
Pluralist democracy potentially engages most citizens in the affairs of
governance, and that engagement encourages cooperation across the board.
If a lot of Americans drop out of or never drop into our system, it will lose
much of that democracy bonus.
Relatedly, the engagement of diverse groups enriches democratic
discourse. When advocates must articulate and defend their proposals to a
variety of perspectives and not just to their core supporters, they are more
likely to moderate and universalize those proposals. Multifaceted critique
offers the possibility that enacted laws will better reflect the interest of all
and not just the whim of a few. "Majority rule ...suffers when it is not
constrained by the need to bargain with minority interests., 73 If groups drop
out of or fail to enter the political system, it will lose voices that would
improve decisionmaking and render it more legitimate.
Identity politics exacerbates both the dynamism and the fragility of
pluralist democracies. The twentieth century witnessed mass social
mobilizations of black, ethnic, female, disabled, and gay Americans seeking
to persuade their fellow citizens that their identifying trait or characteristic
conduct is normal and not a mark of inferiority or degradation. Others
mobilized to oppose these agendas, and their mobilization has yielded new
"traditionalist" identities. America has witnessed an explosion of group
consciousness and activism to forward an increasing array of normative
agendas. For example, "homosexual" did not exist as a social category in
the nineteenth century, but today it represents a polarizing identity that
regularly pits gay Americans against those embracing traditional family
values.
This dynamism-the infusion of new groups, the changing composition
of established groups, and the shifting alliances and social credibility of
various groups-also increases the fragility of our pluralism. Not only does
the proliferation of identity groups increase the situses for conflict in our
society, but it also adds to the intensity of those conflicts.74 There is
substantial intergroup misunderstanding, stereotyping, and hatred. For
example, pro-choice and pro-life people see themselves engaged in a death
struggle for America's soul, as do pro-gay and traditional-family-values
people.
73. GUINIER, supra note 68, at 9; see STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP,
VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990). Other theorists claim that
the state owes minority groups social space as a matter of justice. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA,
POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM AND CITIZENSHIP 2-4, 42
(2001).
74. See Iris Marion Young, Together in Difference: Transforming the Logic of Group
Political Conflict, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 155, 162-65 (Will Kymlicka ed.,
1995).
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A major problem for the multicultural-pluralist polity is how to manage
the emergence, conflict, and triumph of normative identity-based social
movements. In the twentieth century, such movements followed this
pattern: (1) Minority group challenges consensus that its distinguishing trait
(color, sex, sexuality) is a malignant variation from the norm.
(2) Society revises consensus to allow that the minority trait is a tolerable
variation but not as good as the norm (whiteness, maleness,'
heterosexuality). -+ (3) Society revises consensus to recognize that the
minority trait is a benign variation and that there is no single norm.75 At
every stage, traditionalists resist; during the second stage especially,
adherence to traditional status entitlements itself becomes central to many
people's identities.
At each stage, the stakes of politics threaten to get too high. The stakes
are raised, however, in different ways during each stage. (1) When a new
group is emerging, the status quo will tend to suppress that group's
message, disrupt its political mobilization, and perhaps attack its members
through criminal laws. (2) If the new group achieves a foothold in the
political process, it will engage in intense, perhaps furious, debates with
empowered groups over what the prevailing social norm should be. (3) If
the new group persuades Americans that its members deserve (roughly)
equal treatment, it faces the difficult process of weeding out legal
discriminations entrenched in the prior era. Consider these stages in greater
detail.
1. The Problem of Insider Lock-Ins and Outsider Suppression
When a traditionally marginalized social group asserts its rights to
participate in public life, the natural reaction of status quo groups is to
reject the claim for participation. This is not just an abstract exercise in
preserving the reins of power. Often this involves a politics of disgust,
where members of society identify some features of the outsider group as a
social "pollution" of society, especially of young people.76 Because the
insider groups control government processes, they may try to lock in their
dominance and suppress the outsider group through voting exclusions,
educational campaigns of vilification, censorship of minority perspectives,
and the like. Sometimes these campaigns are successful; an example is the
federal government's campaign to crush Mormon polygamy in the late
75. See Eskridge, supra note 14, at 2069-72.
76. See MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTS OF
POLLUTION AND TABOO 123-24 (1995) (arguing that the politics of disgust acts as social
boundary maintenance to guard against social pollution).
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nineteenth century.77 More often, these campaigns are only successful in the
short or medium term; examples are apartheid's reign of terror and the
antihomosexual lavender scare.
78
Discouraging out-group dissent and participation in the political
process is antidemocratic for reasons that Ely recognized.79 It is also
dangerously antithetical to a democratic pluralism, which depends on
changing issues and alliances to assure all groups that they can achieve
some of their goals through politics. If some groups are locked out or
cannot present their perspectives, they have fewer incentives to advance
their goals through democratic politics. Worse than dropping out, these new
social groups might never join the system. Not only is the polity deprived of
the minority's unique contributions, but groups unwelcome in the political
process might revolt against it, engaging in acts of violence and seeking to
overthrow the system.
There is also a more subtle way that outsider lock-outs undermine
democratic pluralism. A stable pluralist system requires instability among
the contending social groups.80 If an insider group is able to freeze political
alignments and identities, even in part, it can thereby reduce the incidence
of cross-cutting loyalties, which yield political opportunities for minorities.
For example, antigay public policies, such as the Texas Homosexual
Conduct Law, are classic examples of a politics of disgust. An important
object is to keep LGBT people in the closet or scare them away from the
jurisdiction. The effect of such policies is not just to retard political power
for gays but also to deny women and racial minorities potential allies.
2. The Problem of Culture Wars
If a minority gains enough social traction to become politically salient,
its members will press their interests and their normative agenda in the
political process-and will meet furious resistance from those who view
minority rights as polluting society. The nation's debates over abortion and
gay rights illustrate how assimilation of the minority into the pluralist
system raises core identity issues on both sides: As a gay person, I deserve
77. See RICHARD S. VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY: A HISTORY 115-23 (2d ed.
1989); Orma Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases (pts. I & 2), 9 UTAH L.
REV. 308, 543 (1964-1965).
78. DAVID K. JOHNSON, THE LAVENDER SCARE: THE COLD WAR PERSECUTION OF GAYS
AND LESBIANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2004).
79. ELY, supra note 3, at 110-25.
80. Robert A. Dahl, Pluralism Revisited, 10 COMP. POL. 191, 199 (1978); see also GUINIER,
supra note 68, at 4; Miller, supra note 67, at 742; Michael Parenti, Power and Pluralism: A View
from the Bottom, 32 J. POL. 501 (1970) (explaining that when political power is entrenched among
dominant interests, protest groups are more likely to seek change through unconventional
channels).
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equal treatment from the state, which requires recognition of same-sex
marriages. As a fundamentalist Christian, I deserve state respect for
traditional family values, which requires nonrecognition of same-sex
marriages. Identity politics gets intensely personal, and the stakes get high.
What Clifford Geertz describes -as "primordial" loyalties--one's race,
ethnicity, religion, sexuality-and what Mary Douglas describes as the
politics of disgust are not matters that can be resolved or calmly evaluated
through public deliberation. 8' To the extent they become matters for
political debate, they will be deeply divisive and acrimonious.
Once the politics of disgust moves from a one-sided battle, where the
majority suppresses a minority, to a two-sided battle, society faces a culture
war. Culture war issues that intensely and evenly divide society pose strong
challenges for any democracy.82 But a badly managed democracy can
deepen the dangers of culture wars. Specifically, there are three different
ways the state can dangerously raise the stakes of politics in its response to
these inherently contentious issues. All three ways represent the state's
premature abandonment of a relatively neutral stance toward fiercely
contending cultural groups.
First, the state might force assimilation upon an unwilling minority,
perhaps by requiring it to engage in conformist rituals antithetical to its
members' preferences or by commandeering subcultural institutions.
Chancellor Bismarck's Kulturkampf of the 1870s and 1880s sought to
domesticate Germany's Roman Catholic Church by jailing dissident clergy
and monitoring the church's doctrine.83 The United States did much the
same thing to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.84 Requiring
Jehovah's Witness children to pledge allegiance to civil authority is a more
recent example of this coercive politics of assimilation.85 Where the
minority is an established social group, as German Catholics were and
Mormon polygamists were not, forced assimilation is a recipe for social
turmoil.
Second, the state might support a campaign of demonization of the out-
group from civil society, usually in support of separation, detention, or
expulsion of the out-group's members. The politics of demonization can
81. See DOUGLAS, supra note 76, at 122-24; CLIFFORD GEERTZ, The Integrative Revolution:
Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States, in THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES 255, 259 (1973); see also HOLMES, supra note 70, at 202-35 (arguing for gag rules
restricting political engagement on irresolvable primordial issues such as slavery and religion).
82. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 93-99 (1956) (suggesting that a
stable "polyarchy" must avoid political divisions that are both intense and evenly matched).
83. Ronald J. Ross, Enforcing the Kulturkampf in the Bismarckian State and the Limits of
Coercion in Imperial Germany, 56 J. MOD. HIST. 456 (1984).
84. See sources cited supra note 77.
85. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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involve stereotypes as well as prejudices against the group, and usually
both. Examples include Spain's expulsion of the Jews in 1492 (after a
partially successful campaign of assimilation) 6 and the post-Civil War
apartheid regime in this country. As noted before, this is a dangerous
strategy, one that assures social turmoil when the demonized minority or its
friends include ordinary Americans.
Third, the state might impose permanent defeat upon a social group and
seek closure of an important issue that divides the polity deeply but evenly.
Queen Mary of England (1553-1558) did this when she imposed Roman
Catholicism as the mandatory religion, over the objections of millions of
Protestants. The best example in American history is the Dred Scott case,
which ruled that the federal government could not constitutionally abolish
slavery.87 By hardwiring a primordially contentious issue into the
Constitution and essentially removing it from politics, the Court's decision
seemed like an effort to remove the unresolved slavery debate from
political engagement and contributed to the breakdown of ordinary politics
and, almost immediately, the national union.88
Forced assimilation, demonization, and permanent defeat of robust
social groups pose huge risks for the polity. They may be risks worth taking
under some circumstances, but the state undermines its own viability when
it adopts such stakes-raising policies. To begin with, stakes raising by the
state is likely to be counterproductive once the out-group has become
politically viable. State persecution may invigorate the out-group and attract
allies to its cause. If that happens, assimilation is disrupted, previously
closed issues are reopened, and separated demons invade the body politic.
Second, and more important, stakes raising encourages the out-group to exit
or lose interest in democratic pluralism, or not to work within the system
from the beginning. This generates the problems discussed above:
possibility of collapse, loss of synergistic cooperation, and impoverishment
of discourse.
In addition, political contests will become dirtier and more bitter.
Escalating status contests create large costs to the groups engaged in the
conflicts and divert them from productive enterprises. 89 Even winners may
be alienated from politics, and certainly losers will be. Culture wars fanned
by the state sometimes become games of chicken. In a game of chicken,
86. See generally B. NETANYAHU, THE ORIGINS OF THE INQUISITION IN FIFTEENTH
CENTURY SPAIN (1995).
87. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
88. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS 3 (1978).
89. See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992) (exploring the
inefficiencies of status contests).
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two young people with more hormones than brains drive junky cars at high
speeds toward one another. The first to swerve loses. If both swerve they
both lose. If neither swerves they both lose (big). When the stakes of
politics get high, and especially when they involve primordial loyalties,
warring groups are more likely to engage in games of chicken, where the
goal of each group becomes imposing harm or status denigration on the
other.
Games of chicken can take the form either of private feuds (played
outside the state) or of punitive legislation (played inside the state).
Abortion politics is an example. Some pro-life Americans have abandoned
state processes and mounted campaigns of private economic warfare or
even violence against abortion providers. A key justification for the
Leviathan is to head off private games of chicken; if rising stakes drive
cultural combatants into private feuds, the whole point of the state is lost. If
one or more groups deploy the state in a public game of chicken, the result
can be worse, because the state itself becomes the enemy from the
perspective of the persecuted group.
3. The Transition Problem: Obsolescent Legal Rules After a
Normative Regime Shift
Because of inertia built into our representative democracy, the law does
not always change as social norms move from one stage to the next. Thus,
even when our culture accepts a social movement's claim that its members'
trait is not threatening to society, laws reflecting that norm might remain on
the books. Changes in the law might never get onto the crowded legislative
agenda. Even if they are on the agenda, determined (and freshly politicized)
minorities can block legal change at any of various veto gates in that
process. For example, the antihomosexual rules and statutes adopted
between 1945 and 1996 marked LGBT people as the worst sort of outlaws
and social threats. This legal regime was founded upon the consensus that
homosexuality is a malignant variation from the norm (heterosexuality).
Even though a new consensus has emerged that homosexuality is a
tolerable variation, many antigay rules remain in place because legislators
are squeamish about raising volatile issues of sexuality, because an intense
minority of traditionalists vow revenge on any liberalization, or because a
key legislator is simply stubborn and others are unwilling to rile him.
90
The perseverance of such obsolescent rules renders government less
responsive to the changing relations of political forces, which is important
90. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 20, at 139-48 (discussing the perseverance of antigay laws in
America).
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to a stable democracy. 9' These rules are also frustrating, sometimes greatly
so, to the former out-group still stigmatized by them, and their continued
existence may even help reignite or prolong culture wars at the local level.
These phenomena may affect the commitment of minorities to the ongoing
pluralist project of democratic engagement.
B. How Judicial Review Can Strengthen Pluralist Democracy by
Lowering Its Stakes
According to Adam Przeworski, "Constitutions that are observed and
last for a long time are those that reduce the stakes of political battles."
92
Such constitutions "define the scope of government and establish rules of
competition, leaving substantive outcomes open to the political interplay. 93
Although Przeworski does not apply his insight to judicial review, it readily
supports a stakes-lowering role for judges: They can facilitate the operation
of a pluralist democracy by countering or ameliorating some of the stakes-
raising tendencies of the political process (insider lock-ins, culture wars,
obsolete statutes).
Does such a political theory have any connection to our Constitution?
Much as Ely argued for representation reinforcement theory, this Section
demonstrates that a stakes-lowering theory is supported by the
Constitution's structure and the philosophy of its Religion Clauses, which
provide general principles to guide courts applying the open-textured
provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Unlike representation
reinforcement theory, this pluralism-facilitating theory provides
justifications for some of the Rehnquist Court's most controversial
opinions.
1. Enforcing Neutral Rules of Political Engagement
The Constitution lays down rules structuring a political process that
invites social groups to participate. The Constitution of 1787 creates a
national government with limited jurisdiction and residual authority left to
the states,94 thereby assuring a diverse array of local, state, and national
politics and policies. Uniform national law is created only through specified
91. PRZEWORSKI, supra note 69, at 37.
92. Id. at 36.
93. Id.
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (primary articulation of congressional powers); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1
& § 2 (presidential powers); id. art. II1, § 2, cl. I (judicial power).
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procedures, requiring coalitions of diverse interests and perspectives. 95 The
First Amendment guarantees that Congress cannot abridge freedom of
speech, the press, assembly, or petition-broad liberties of political
participation implicitly applicable to groups as well as individuals. Since
1791, one-third of the amendments to the Constitution have guaranteed
voting rights to previously disenfranchised groups of Americans. 96 With
ambiguities at the margins, most of these are bright-line rules that were
expected to be enforced by the Supreme Court-and they should be, to the
letter.
The first two Carolene Products prongs directly reflect this
constitutional structure, and a primary role of pluralism-facilitating judicial
review is to enforce those rules of the political game. Following Ely's
referee analogy, judges should enforce these rules, regardless of the
desirability of the outcomes reached outside the constitutionally prescribed
process. Because strict enforcement invests the political process with
greater neutrality, it contributes to lower stakes. Thus, United States v.
Lopez, where the Court rebuked Congress for behaving as though there
were no real limits on its power to legislate under the Commerce Clause,
was an excellent decision.97 In contrast, United States v. Morrison, where
Congress was hewing to Article I's jurisdictional requirements and the
Court essentially disagreed with Congress's substantive judgment, strikes
me as less defensible.98 A referee should whistle down even popular players
who behave as though the rules don't apply to them (Lopez) but should give
the players leeway to play the game when they are following the letter of
the law (Morrison).
At least as important is strict judicial enforcement of the First
Amendment. Long before the birth control and gay rights movements made
much headway with mainstream America, federal courts had ruled that the
government could not censor their public advocacy and informational
publications.99 The Supreme Court expanded this idea in the civil rights sit-
95. Id. art. I, § 7 (lawmaking through bicameral congressional approval and presentment to
the President); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (treaties through presidential initiative and assent of two-thirds
of voting senators).
96. Id. amend. XV (nonwhites); id. amend. XIX (women); id. amend. XXIII (D.C. residents);
id. amend. XXIV (no poll tax); id. amend. XXVI (eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds); cf id.
amend. XVII (direct election of senators).
97. 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's
"Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1447,
1452-53, 1482-84 (1995) (praising Lopez).
98. 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 80, 111-15 (2001) (criticizing Morrison).
99. E.g., One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (mem.) (reversing a lower court ruling that
a postmaster could censor materials that discussed homosexuality sympathetically); United States
v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930) (holding that the state cannot censor sex- and birth-control-
education materials); see Nancy J. Knauer, Homosexuality as Contagion: From The Well of
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in and marching cases. Even when engaging in expressive "conduct,"
minority groups are entitled to significant First Amendment protection.
00
The marching cases, in particular, provided background support for Hurley,
where the Court protected traditionalist expression in the context of a public
parade while casually asserting that the state owes the same obligation to
gay-friendly parades. A pluralist understanding of the First Amendment
supports these broad readings. Not only does open and public advocacy
advance public debate and individual autonomy (the traditional First
Amendment values), but it also keeps old groups as well as new ones
working within the pluralist system and affords them opportunities to create
alliances with other groups by publicizing their cause.
For the same reasons, the First Amendment requires considerable
leeway for pro-life Americans to express themselves, although the
sometimes harassing nature of their speech requires a more complex
balance. Madsen and Hill reflect the Court's practical effort to keep pro-
choice and pro-life groups from each other's throats, but without depriving
the latter of opportunities to educate women seeking abortions. I have no
view as to precisely how that balance should be set, but Chief Justice
Rehnquist's approach in Madsen, followed in Hill, strikes me as most
sensible. 01 Buffer zones will not resolve the abortion wars, but they are a
reasonable means of respecting pro-life expression without unduly
burdening women's exercise of abortion choice. They also offer the
attractive possibility of keeping the stakes of abortion politics within
acceptable limits.
2. Ameliorating Culture Wars
The Constitution's Framers did not foresee our modem culture wars,
but they did address the most important disgust-provoking loyalties of their
era in the Religion Clauses.102 Those Clauses bar the state from raising the
stakes of (primordial) religious disagreements, which occurs when the state
takes sides in such disputes by assimilating, marginalizing, or demonizing
Loneliness to the Boy Scouts, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 401, 430-54 (2000) (discussing the
unsuccessful state censorship of lesbian romance novels).
100. E.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
101. The balance set in Hill is also attractive for a pluralistic reason: The majority included
pro-life Chief Justice Rehnquist, pro-choice Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, pro-liberty Justice
Souter, and pro-centrism-at-all-costs Justices O'Connor and Breyer.
102. For excellent introductions to the Religion Clauses and their history, see ARLIN M.
ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES (1990); Noah Feldman, The Intellectual
Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346 (2002); and Michael W. McConnell,
The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409
(1990).
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religious minorities. The Constitution has generalized each of those
principles for management of group conflict in the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Those constitutional provisions should be read in light of the
Religion Clauses when called upon to adjudicate primordial issues such as
race, ethnicity, gender role, sexuality, and disability.' 3
a. No Forced Assimilation: The State Cannot Impose Identity-
Based Conformity upon Minorities (Speech Clause)
The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from coercing
people to participate in religious exercises not otherwise congenial to their
self-identification. 1°4  The Free Exercise Clause protects religious
organizations against direct state regulation. The central idea is that
"religious beliefs and religious expression are too precious," or primordial
and combustible, "to be either proscribed or prescribed by the State."' 5 The
Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment generalize this insight to
other deeply expressive matters.
The Court has applied the Speech Clause to assure that identity-based
and other groups can form, develop their perspectives and messages, and
proselytize.10 6 This group-protecting mode of judicial review is an
expansion of Ely's admonition that the presumption of constitutionality
does not apply when the "ins" try to block the "outs" from gaining political
coherence and traction, through censorship, harassment, and the like.
Group-protecting review draws Ely's insight (based on the civil rights
movement's claims) forward into the modem era of women's and gay
rights.
This broader twist on Carolene Products provides a pluralism-
facilitating justification for Dale and Hurley. If application of a public
accommodations law to the Boston parade organizers or the Boy Scouts is
an ideological prescription to those traditionalist groups, as Court majorities
found in Hurley and Dale, then judicial review is warranted for pluralist-
facilitating reasons such as those suggested by the Religion Clauses. Just as
the state cannot tell religions how to choreograph their services and whom
to ordain as their priests or rabbis, so it cannot tell traditionalists how they
103. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion,
Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J.
2411, 2427-30, 2441-47 (1997) (applying principles derived from the Religion Clauses to
sexuality issues).
104. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992); id. at 609-31 (Souter, J., concurring)
(analyzing the history of the prohibition of religious coercion).
105. Id. at 589 (majority opinion).
106. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (holding that expressive associations have
independent First Amendment rights).
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must choreograph their parades (Hurley) or whom they may present as
leaders of their expressive associations (Dale). Just as Romer and Lawrence
are important to reassure gay people that the state cannot impose
traditionalist rules upon their expressive activities and associations, so Dale
and Hurley are useful reassurances to traditionalists that the state cannot
impose politically correct rules upon their expressive activities and
associations.
b. No Demonization: Channeling Political Discourse away from
Prejudice and Stereotypes (Equal Protection Clause)
The Free Exercise Clause directs that state regulations are invalid if
they implement religious prejudice. 10 7 This constitutional rule reflects the
wisdom of preventing inflammatory religious acrimonies from going public
and of heading off religious wars, classic games of chicken. Such a
constitutional rule also channels political discourse toward criteria that can
be productively debated on terms that most people in the polity can
appreciate. The Constitution generalizes this channeling principle in the
Equal Protection Clause, which has been applied to invalidate laws inspired
by other primordial loyalties and prejudices, including ethnicity, 10 8 race, 109
disability," 0 and now sexual orientation, after Romer.
Channeling provides support for Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
in Lawrence. Declining to join the overruling of Bowers v. Hardwick,'11 she
would have invalidated Texas's Homosexual Conduct Law on equal
protection grounds. "Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to
harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis
review under the Equal Protection Clause."' 1 2 Consistent with pluralism-
facilitating judicial review, this stance lowers the stakes of politics by
assuring gay people that they cannot be treated as outlaws and by removing
from the political sphere divisive arguments that homosexuals should be
stigmatized. Conversely, O'Connor's approach signals no disrespect to
107. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding that
a city cannot create rules targeting a religious minority for unique disadvantage). For some
healthy skepticism about taking motivation analysis too far, see John Hart Ely, The Centrality and
Limits of Motivation Analysis, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1155, 1160-61 (1978).
108. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that a city cannot create and enforce
rules targeting an ethnic minority for unique disadvantages).
109. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that a state cannot disadvantage
different-race couples to protect their children from social prejudice).
110. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that a city
cannot create zoning rules targeting people with disabilities for unique disadvantages).
111. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
112. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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traditionalists who oppose the "homosexual agenda" but suggests that their
political arguments need to be constructive rather than animus filled.
Accordingly, traditionalists still have arguments to support some
antigay policies. Soon after Lawrence, the Eleventh Circuit upheld
Florida's law barring gays from adopting children. Mindful of the
O'Connor concurrence, the court found that the state law was not based on
antigay animus but was, instead, a rational even if debatable judgment that
lesbian and gay adoptions would not be in the best interests of adopted
children, who flourish in traditional nuclear families. 13 Dissenting from the
denial of an en banc rehearing, Judge Barkett quarreled with the court's
conclusion that there is a sufficient connection between the welfare of
children and the statutory discrimination-but she did not reject the
majority's assumption that some laws discriminating against gay people can
survive Romer and Lawrence. 1
4
As in Craig, the Court's heightened scrutiny of sex-based
classifications usually turns on whether the state is relying on gender
stereotypes; rarely is the charge made that state laws reflect misogyny or
prejudice against women. Romer was a state measure supported by appeals
more to antigay stereotypes than to antigay prejudice.1 5 Should pluralism-
facilitating judicial review monitor such legislation? It should, because
prejudice and stereotyping are related, the latter often a cognitive
manifestation of the former. Stereotype-monitoring judicial review helps
ensure that prejudice does not sneak back into political discourse through
the back door of stereotypes. (This may have been going on in the
campaign that brought Colorado Amendment 2.) Additionally, political
campaigns demonizing a group based on stereotypes about its members are
almost as divisive as campaigns based on appeals to prejudice. Both raise
the stakes of politics and invite political games of chicken. Stereotype-
monitoring review subserves the channeling goal: Political discourse not
only needs to focus on the overall public interest but also needs to maintain
a modest accountability to the facts.
This take on Craig and Romer can also support O'Connor's approach to
affirmative action and majority-minority electoral districts. Consistent with
Ely's rejection of heightened scrutiny for programs where majorities are
helping minorities, it would be a democratic tragedy for the Court to rule
113. Lofion v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (Lofton 1), 358 F.3d 804 (1 1th
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
114. Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (Lofton 11), 377 F.3d 1275,
1290-313 (11 th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
115. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE
LAW 1524-31 (2d ed. 2004) (displaying ballot materials demonstrating that the state amendment
was touted as a response to predatory and diseased homosexuals, both unsupported stereotypes).
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that the government can never create race-based remedial or diversifying
programs. Such a ruling would remove a vigorously contested matter from
the political process and would make it harder for some minorities to share
in America's opportunities and for some government agencies to do their
jobs. 1 6  A pluralism-facilitating perspective, however, is open to
O'Connor's view that unmonitored affirmative action tends to become race-
based pork barrel that risks perpetuating racial stereotypes and, perhaps,
prejudice. By engaging in heightened scrutiny of race-based affirmative
action plans and electoral districts, the Court has channeled political
discourse away from a racial spoils system and toward a national
conversation about diversity in schools, legislatures and agencies, and the
broadcast media.
O'Connor's opinion in Grutter is a pluralism-facilitating classic. Its
most prominent feature is an endorsement of diversity and educational
quality as important state interests justifying some consideration of race in
law school (and university) admissions.'17 This is a landmark holding, the
first time the post-Brown Court has upheld a race-based classification in a
nonremedial setting. O'Connor's reasoning avoids both a whites-only racial
spoils system reflecting the status quo and a minority-favoring racial spoils
system based on the politics of remediation. Her focus is on what is good
government and good policy for all Americans, and the literature and amici
she cites are strong evidence that what is good for democratic pluralism (all
races included in important programs) is also good for modern governance
(effective educational programs).
There is contrary evidence that O'Connor did not cite, 1 8 and the matter
remains fairly debatable. But this is precisely the circumstance where the
Court should not lay down an absolute rule, as Justices Scalia and Thomas
would have done. They predicted that O'Connor's approach will invite
further litigation,119 as indeed it will-but it will also invite further
affirmative action experiments and empirical or other studies as to how they
work. That kind of channeling not only lowers the stakes of politics by
focusing our attention on the pragmatic features of diversity rather than the
116. See Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241); DIVERSITY
CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Gary Orfield with Michal
Kurlaender eds., 2001). Both of these sources were both cited and followed by Justice O'Connor's
opinion for the Court in Grutter. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31.
117. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327-33; see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268 (Rehnquist,
C.J.) (following Grutter on this issue).
118. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364-65 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(surveying contrary evidence).
119. Id. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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primordial ones, but also generates information that has the potential to
advance the interests of everyone.
c. No Permanent Losers: Neutrality (Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses)
The Establishment Clause says that the state cannot declare one official
religion.120 Even if the state does not suppress competing religions, it
cannot lend its exclusive support to one orthodoxy, and it needs to avoid
excessive entanglement with sectarian positions. This is a principle that can
be generalized if done cautiously. The Equal Protection Clause was aimed
at preventing what contemporaries called "class legislation." Its drafters and
contemporaries believed that it augured against an out-caste, a group of
citizens who are permanent losers in politics. 121 This notion is related to the
Due Process Clause's assurance that a neutral rule of law will be applied to
all persons, which implies that the law will not be applied arbitrarily against
a class of disfavored Americans. 122 The no-permanent-losers idea,
suggested by the Establishment Clause for the primordial issue the Framers
did address and generalized in the Fourteenth Amendment, is a key feature
of pluralism-facilitating judicial review.
This principle helped Justice Kennedy answer Justice O'Connor's
question in Lawrence: Why should the Court deploy substantive due
process to purge Texas of its Homosexual Conduct Law when a narrower
ground existed in the Equal Protection Clause? Even when state law makes
all consensual sodomy a crime, it is deployed to transform lesbians and gay
men into an outlaw class. While a straight woman is almost as likely to
have engaged in consensual oral sex as a lesbian, Southern judges have
stripped lesbians of their children on the ground that such mothers were
presumptive criminals. 123 The federal government justified the statutory
exclusion of gay people from the armed forces on the ground that such
people were presumptive criminals because they have a "propensity" to
commit sodomy. 124  These conduct-based disabilities have ensured
marginalization for gay people as a group because they encourage most gay
120. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REv. 1, 1 (1996).
121. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988) (surveying the
ratification debates).
122. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (stating that due process rule of law
includes an anti-unreasonableness feature).
123. E.g., Exparte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793 (Ala. 1998); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d
102 (Va. 1995).
124. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(4)-(15) (2000).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1308 [Vol. 114: 1279
HeinOnline  -- 114 Yale L.J. 1308 2004-2005
Pluralism and Distrust
people to remain at least partly closeted and, hence, less politically
cohesive. 25 "Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand
respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are
linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances
both interests.' 26
Because consensual sodomy laws rendered gay people a politically
marginal underclass of presumptive outlaws, Bowers raised the stakes of
politics for gay people. For pluralist-facilitating reasons, it was important
for the Supreme Court to purge the Constitution of Bowers's disrespectful
language, which would not have been accomplished by O'Connor's equal
protection dodge. This explains the tone as well as the result of Kennedy's
opinion. Realizing that enthusiastic support for consensual sodomy laws
had all but disappeared, even in the South, Kennedy not only overruled
Bowers but also disapproved of the earlier decision as a non-neutral
application of constitutional principle. The suggestion, appreciated by
LGBT people, was that gay people are no longer American outlaws and,
indeed, are American citizens entitled to full respect.
3. Reversing the Burden of Inertia for Obsolete Statutory Policies
(Due Process Clause)
The Due Process Clause requires that the government act according to
the "law of the land," that is, through generalized rules serving the public
interest.27 The Court has understood due process to require that criminal
statutes, in particular, give clear notice of precisely what conduct is illegal;
vague criminal laws are void.' 28 Some of the void-for-vagueness cases also
relate to the due process notion that there must be a rational connection
between a law's means and legitimate state goals. Thus, laws criminalizing
conduct that everyone now engages in have lost the rational basis that once
underlay them. 1
29
Many state laws harming women's interests were adopted before
women had the right to vote and were the result of a process in which
125. See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption
and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, " 108 YALE L.J. 485 (1998) (arguing that gay people's
relative invisibility and ease of passing undermine their political coherence).
126. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
127. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 580-82 (1819)
(argument of Daniel Webster).
128. See [Anthony G. Amsterdam], Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960) (arguing that the void-for-vagueness doctrine not only
assures people fair notice but also narrows police discretion in the enforcement of criminal laws).
129. Cf. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161-64, 169-71 (1972) (striking
down an antiquated vagrancy law that criminalized activities, like hanging out with friends, now
taken for granted by most Americans).
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women's interests were not appropriately considered. Even though
women's interests are better represented in today's politics, women face a
high burden to weed out discriminatory laws adopted before they had the
franchise. Because there are so many veto gates within the legislative
process, it is notoriously easier for a group to block legislative action than
to procure it. Ely considered pre-1920 sex discriminations ripe for
invalidation, with the understanding that the legislature could reinstate
them. 130 This is one way to interpret Reed, the Court's first sex
discrimination kill. Reed was an application of rational basis review.
Although law professors treat Reed as a harbinger of heightened
scrutiny, one can also read it for the following proposition: When the
disadvantaged group is one that was not well represented when a statute
was adopted, rational basis review requires the court to evaluate the law on
the basis of its original purpose and bars the court from supplying rational
but hypothetical purposes to save the law. The effect of such a doctrine is to
reverse the burden of inertia as to obsolescent laws.13' Rather than
requiring women to persuade the Idaho legislature to repeal the law, the
Court properly imposed the burden of legislative action on the supporters of
the apparently obsolete policy.
C. What Judicial Review Should Presumptively Avoid: Do Not Drastically
Raise the Stakes of Politics
Courts can promote (multicultural) pluralistic democracy by enforcing
neutral rules, ameliorating culture wars, and reversing the burden of inertia
for obsolete statutes. But courts have the potential to undermine democracy
as well. Judicial review can raise the stakes of politics by taking issues
away from the political system prematurely; by frustrating a group's ability
to organize, bond, and express the values of its members; or by demonizing
an out-group. The Supreme Court has plenty of doctrinal tools that can keep
it from fanning the flames of high-stakes identity politics issues. These
include the "passive virtues," where the Court deploys procedural doctrines
to avoid decisions that might settle controversial issues prematurely;' 32 a
"minimalist" approach to constitutional law, in which decisions are reached
on narrow case-specific grounds and expansive principles are announced
130. ELY, supra note 3, at 167-70.
131. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)
(proposing that courts be empowered to overrule obsolescent statutes the way they overrule
obsolescent precedents).
132. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (arguing that the Court should often dispose of controversial cases
on procedural grounds like ripeness, standing, and mootness).
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only after considerable feedback from lower courts and the political
process;133 and doctrines such as void for vagueness and narrow statutory
interpretations when constitutional values are implicated, which allow the
political process to respond. 
1 34
The Brown litigation exemplifies the tricky balancing act involved
when high-stakes issues reach the Court. For half a generation before
Brown, the Supreme Court overturned particular race-based
discriminations, but without directly challenging apartheid. The Justices
surmised that a broad ruling striking down racial segregation would rile
Southern whites and would not be supported by the rest of the country. That
balance changed after World War II, which had seen African Americans
serve with valor in (sometimes integrated) combat. People of color grew
more insistent that they not be treated like second-class citizens, and white
support for segregation outside the South eroded. The stakes of segregation
politics reached a boiling point in the early 1950s-yet the Court continued
to issue narrow rulings, striking down segregation on either statutory or as-
applied grounds. 
35
Only after both the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations took firm
anti-apartheid stands did the Court act, in Brown L136 In the short term, that
decision raised the stakes of race politics in the South. Although civil rights
struggles were already escalating, Brown gave them a push. For example,
the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955-1956 was resolved in favor of civil
rights advocates when a federal judge applied Brown to invalidate the city's
busing rules.' 37 Fearful of raising the stakes too much, the Court moderated
its anti-apartheid mandate in Brown II, which required progress toward
desegregation "with all deliberate speed. 1 38 Although Brown raised the
stakes of race politics in the short term, the Court was tackling an issue that
was already controversial, and it passively deferred to local and later
133. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996) (advocating a "minimalist" approach to judicial review
where the Court rarely announces broad new principles and instead proceeds incrementally).
134. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1007 (1989) (arguing for the implementation of public values through statutory interpretations
that can be reversed by the legislature).
135. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (finding segregated railroad cars
inconsistent with the Interstate Commerce Act); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (requiring
a segregated graduate program to admit a qualified black student). On the Justices' deliberations
in these cases, see Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the
Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 14-30 (1979).
136. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
137. Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956); see ALDON D. MORRIS, THE
ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 56
(1984).
138. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). On the rise and fall of
massive resistance to desegregation, see NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE
RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950's, at 338-39 (1969).
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national political processes. In the segregation cases, the Court deployed all
available mechanisms-judicial minimalism and provisional rulings at first,
then passive virtues-to keep the political stakes from escalating out of
control. The Court enforced Brown more aggressively only after the
Johnson Administration provided legislative and executive support for
desegregation. In the longer term, Brown was slowly implemented and the
stakes of race politics receded in the South. 3 9
If the desegregation cases are a relative success story, other Supreme
Court decisions, one assailed by Ely and the other superficially consistent
with his theory, dramatically illustrate the Court's ability to raise the stakes
of politics when it acts prematurely or carelessly.
1. Scylla: Roe v. Wade
Contrast Roe v. Wade140 with Brown. In 1973, it was premature to lay
down, as Roe did, a national policy that declared the pro-life position
unconstitutional. It had taken the Court decades of litigation to accept the
NAACP's position on apartheid, and the Court did so only after a
consensus had developed outside the South and with a pragmatic approach
to remediation. Roe was just the second abortion case the Justices had
heard, and the country itself was not at rest on the issue-yet the Court
announced a very broad libertarian rule, which it reaffirmed and expanded
in 1976.1
4 1
Roe essentially declared a winner in one of the most difficult and
divisive public law debates of American history. Don't bother going to state
legislatures to reverse that decision. Don't bother trying to persuade your
neighbors (unless your neighbor is Justice Powell). Roe was a threat to our
democracy because it raised the stakes of an issue where primordial
loyalties ran deep. Not only did Roe energize the pro-life movement and
accelerate the infusion of sectarian religion into American politics, but it
also radicalized many traditionalists. Pro-life Americans behaved as though
they had been disowned by this country. And to a certain extent they had
been.
In the early 1970s, state legislatures all over the country were in the
process of revising their abortion laws. The matter was one of intense
political debate, and the country was hardly at rest. Under such
139. See Frank T. Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v.
Board of Education, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1995, at 7.
140. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
141. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking down a law
that defined the fetus as a person and required both parental consent for minors and spousal
consent for wives seeking abortions).
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circumstances, the Court should have exercised its agenda-setting authority
to deny review in Roe and other cases so that the issue could ripen. What
normative lessons would different state experiences have provided?
142
If the Court was determined to decide Roe, a more appropriate
resolution would have been one that reversed the burden of legislative
inertia. The year before Roe, Judges Lumbard and Newman ruled
Connecticut's 1860 abortion law invalid on due process obsolescence
grounds. Lumbard focused on the changing role of women; Newman
focused on medical advances. Both found that a law constitutional when
enacted had lost its original rationale over time-there was no longer a
rational basis for the restriction on women's liberty. 143 In Roe itself, Justice
Blackmun's original draft opinion would have invalidated the aged Texas
law on vagueness grounds: The law's allowance for abortions that would
save the life of the mother gave insufficient guidance to doctors to know
exactly when abortion was a serious crime. 144
The Roe Court ultimately rejected this initial draft, as well as the
Lumbard-Newman approach, but either approach would have had the
pluralism-facilitating advantage of sweeping off the statute books a woman-
burdening law enacted before women could vote, without the disadvantage
of raising the stakes of politics as much as the privacy opinion in Roe did.
Pro-life forces could have returned to the Texas legislature and procured
new legislation. But because the burden of inertia would have already been
overcome, and because women's interests would have been represented,
any new law would probably have been a more moderate burden on
women's right to choose abortions.1 45 It would also have been accompanied
by a more complete examination of exactly what neutral state interests are
advanced by prohibiting or regulating the right to choose abortions.
142. Compare Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), especially the concurring
opinions of Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer, who rejected a general constitutional "right to
die" but also concluded that it was premature to reject such claims under all circumstances.
143. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 801-05 (D. Conn. 1972) (three-judge court)
(Lumbard, J.), vacated, 410 U.S. 951 (1973) (mem.); id. at 805-12 (Newman, J., concurring in the
result).
144. Memorandum of Justice Harry A. Blackmun to the Conference (May 18, 1972) (on file
with Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Madison Building, Manuscript Division, container
151, folder 6) (containing a draft of Blackmun's initial opinion in Roe, which would have struck
down Texas's abortion law on vagueness grounds and reserved the plaintiff's privacy claim).
145. Compare Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), where the Roe Court evaluated a more
recent, and less burdensome, restriction on abortion. Under my approach, the Court would not
have taken review in Doe (or would have disposed of the case on narrow procedural grounds),
leaving the balance between women's choice and the asserted right to life to the political process
(and the lower courts) for several years.
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2. Charybdis: Bowers v. Hardwick
Ironically, Bowers v. Hardwick146 was a judicial blunder in the same
way as Roe---even though the Court upheld Georgia's consensual sodomy
law. When the Court rejects a constitutional challenge to state legislation, it
does not have the effect of removing an important yet divisive issue from
the political process, as Roe purported to do. But Bowers illustrates the
dangers of validating outmoded laws, especially when executed by a
judicial opinion violating the neutrality norm and reaffirming the outlawing
of a class of Americans.
Justice White's dismissive opinion in Bowers can be faulted for
underestimating Americans' constitutional commitment to sexual privacy
and their assumption that the police could not monitor their bedrooms.
Under a pluralism-facilitating model, Bowers's bigger blunder was its ham-
handed treatment of a sensitive primordial issue. Even though Georgia's
law applied to all kinds of sodomy, the Court obsessively focused on
"homosexual sodomy" alone.147 More alarmingly, the Court's reasoning
suggested that "homosexuals," as people who engage in "homosexual
sodomy," can be considered an outlaw class of citizens. As amicus briefs
informed the Court, consensual sodomy laws were almost entirely deployed
to exclude LGBT people from state jobs, including positions in the public
school system and the armed forces; to discriminate against lesbian and gay
parents in child custody disputes and in adoption proceedings; and to
support other antigay discriminations. 148 Like Roe, Bowers generated a
firestorm of protest-it seemed like a declaration of war by the state against
"homosexuals." Millions of LGBT people, their families, and their friends
were riled by the Court's suggestion that these decent Americans were,
essentially, outlaws.
The Court's blunder was avoidable. Reversing the burden of inertia
through the void-for-vagueness doctrine would have saved the Supreme
Court the Sturm und Drang that accompanied its troubled sodomy law
jurisprudence. Starting in the 1960s, several state courts ruled that "crime
against nature" was too vague a concept to support prosecutions for oral or
anal sex between consenting adults in private places. 49 It would have
146. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
147. Id. at 190-92, 196 (limiting the decision to "homosexual sodomy"); see id. at 215-16
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's limitation was contrary to the evolution of the
Georgia statute).
148. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Project et al., Bowers (No. 85-140).
149. Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969); Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla.
1971); Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1974) (narrowing construction),
habeas granted sub nom. Balthazar v. Superior Court, 428 F. Supp. 425 (D. Mass. 1977), aff'd,
573 F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1978).
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required no stretch of the Court's vagueness precedents to invalidate all
crime-against-nature laws. Because the laws that reached the Court in the
1970s were nineteenth-century relics, it could also have concluded that
application of such laws to private consensual conduct failed the rationality
standard. 150 In the nineteenth century, crime-against-nature laws were
codified in the "public decency" or "crimes against the person" (sexual
assault) titles and were deployed only against public or nonconsensual
conduct) 51 These original goals were not served by application of sodomy
laws to sexual activities between consenting adults in the home, the
scenario in Bowers.
Either a void-for-vagueness or a rational basis analysis barring
application of crime-against-nature laws to consensual activities would
have been a legally cogent and politically safe way for the Court to have
dealt with most of the sodomy challenges that came to it in the fifteen years
before Bowers.1 52 Such a move would have had the advantage of
overturning obsolescent laws that were deployed to harm gay people but
without taking the issue away from the political process. Of course, the
burden of inertia would have been reversed, and proponents of consensual
sodomy laws would have faced many hurdles. After 1970, no state would
have been willing to enact a general sodomy law, for it was widely
understood that married and other straight couples engaged in that activity.
State laws criminalizing only homosexual sodomy or sodomy outside of
marriage would have been possible in some states, but such laws would
then have faced the kinds of arguments Justice O'Connor found persuasive
in Lawrence.
3. Between Scylla and Charybdis: Casey and Lawrence
Roe and Bowers were avoidable exercises in stakes-raising politics.
Both cases could have been dismissed for lack of standing, an application
of the passive virtues that would have allowed state legislatures and state
150. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (mem.) (upholding Virginia's
crime-against-nature law); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975) (per curiam) (upholding
Tennessee's crime-against-nature law); Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973) (per curiam)
(upholding Florida's crime-against-nature law). For references to the original nineteenth-century
crime-against-nature statutes that the states defended in these three cases, see ESKRIDGE, supra
note 20, at 329, 335-36.
151. See Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9-12,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102).
152. The Georgia law at issue in Bowers was not susceptible to either vagueness or rationality
attack because it had been updated in 1968 to define the crime more precisely. 1968 Ga. Laws
1249. Hence, Bowers was the wrong case to invalidate state sodomy laws. The Georgia statute
was ultimately invalidated under the state constitution, in a case involving heterosexual sodomy.
Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
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courts to grapple with abortion and sodomy. The Court could easily have
struck down Texas's abortion law and pre-Bowers crime-against-nature
laws on vagueness grounds that would have allowed the political process to
respond. Either strategy would have allowed the Court to proceed
incrementally before announcing a broad constitutional principle-
precisely the strategy followed in the segregation cases.
Such judicial blunders are not irremediable, however. The Rehnquist
Court retreated from both Roe and Bowers in statesmanlike opinions
designed to lower the stakes of abortion and gay rights politics. In Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey the joint opinion of
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter reaffirmed women's liberty
interest in controlling their pregnancies but reduced Roe to a balancing test
and upheld almost all of the procedural restrictions before the Justices.
153
While reaffirming the centrality of the mother's interest and
decisionmaking capacity, Casey has partially returned abortion regulation
to state and national political discussion. Pro-life advocates have engaged
with this issue in the political process, which has proven fairly responsive
to their arguments. (In Madsen, the Court smartly refused to take sides in
this culture conflict and deployed buffer zones as a way to mediate the
street-level clash between pro-life and pro-choice advocates.) In Lawrence,
the Court overruled Bowers, ending that precedent's reign of error and
freeing gay rights politics to focus on more relevant issues, such as state
exclusions of lesbians and gay men from government employment, child
rearing, and marriage.
Justice Scalia dissented in Casey and Lawrence. Both dissents accused
the majorities of subverting the rule of law and imposing elitist value
judgments unwelcome to popular majorities.' 54 Scalia's denunciatory tone
has no place in a pluralism-facilitating Court. Such emotionalism fuels
anger around these primordial issues. Nonetheless, the dissents also contain
excellent analysis. Scalia usefully questioned whether Casey and Lawrence
are keeping the stakes of abortion and gay rights politics unacceptably high.
By reaffirming Roe, Casey perpetuated its error of removing an important
issue from public discourse and "intensifie[d] the anguish" 155 delivered by
the "Imperial Judiciary," 156 according to Scalia. By repudiating Bowers and
suggesting homosexual equality, Lawrence opened up a Pandora's box: The
entire "homosexual agenda" would soon be thrust down the throats of
153. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., plurality opinion).
154. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586, 602-05 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Casey,
505 U.S. at 996, 1000-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Casey, 505 U.S. at 1002.
156. Id. at 996.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1316 [Vol. 114:1279
HeinOnline  -- 114 Yale L.J. 1316 2004-2005
Pluralism and Distrust
traditionalist states.1 57 Indeed, within a year of Lawrence, lesbian and gay
couples from all over the country were getting married in Massachusetts.
Notwithstanding Scalia's critique, the majority Justices got it right in
Casey and Lawrence. Neither opinion sweeps as broadly as Scalia claimed;
the O'Connor-Kennedy Court will not remove partial-birth abortion or
same-sex marriage from the political agenda.1 58 Both decisions situate the
Court as a relatively neutral arbiter, taking only the most extreme measures
away from legislatures. Indeed, both decisions have a positive effect on our
pluralist democracy, because they channel abortion and gay rights politics
away from criminalization, which is a stakes-raising regulatory tool for
these primordial issues, and toward civil policies, especially fact-based
education. Thus, state law after Casey and Lawrence cannot make women
seeking abortions or gay people presumptive criminals, but the state can
engage in education, expressive politics, and genuine health regulation. The
state can promote motherhood and heterosexuality to a certain extent, and
there is even some room for the state to lobby against abortion and
homosexuality. On the whole, this accommodation lowers the stakes of
politics-and it is relevant that even Scalia's heated dissents have
apparently not had the effect of helping the abortion and homosexuality
pots boil over.
III. APPLYING A PLURALISM-FACILITATING MODEL
TO TODAY'S (AND TOMORROW'S) CONTROVERSIES
I claim three virtues for the pluralism-facilitating model of judicial
review justified and elaborated in the previous Part. First, the model
provides a sensible road map for judicial review that contributes to, rather
than undermines, the central project of the modem Constitution-assuring
orderly debate and (provisional) resolution of divisive political issues in our
multicultural-pluralist democracy. Second, the model's principles are drawn
from the Constitution and are faithful to its structure. Like Ely's project,
mine is to develop a Constitution-based philosophy for interpreting the
open-textured clauses of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Third, the
model provides a coherent framework for making sense of the
constitutional jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court in particular. This third
feature suggests that, in the short term, a pluralism-facilitating model can
provide guidance for thinking about the next generation of constitutional
157. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602-05.
158. See id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that same-sex
marriage bars rest on more than "moral disapproval of an excluded group"); Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914, 947-51 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that states may regulate
partial-birth abortions).
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issues. This Part applies the model to some of the tough issues facing the
Court in the first decade of the new millennium.
Accordingly, this Part applies the pragmatic strategies judges have
followed to minimize their own tendency to raise political stakes (passive
virtues, minimalism, provisional rulings). One feature of our constitutional
order deepens the case for Supreme Court avoidance techniques-
federalism. Sometimes, the United States Supreme Court should leave
identity issues to state-by-state resolution for a period of time. This would
have been a better strategy than Roe's premature bar to abortion regulation
or Bowers's premature reaffirmation of sodomy laws. Different states will
reach different resolutions, which provides an experimental diversity that
will often lower the stakes and bring the country toward a rough consensus
over time.
A. Monitoring the Presidential War on Terror
The executive branch is best able to respond to emergencies and has
understandably taken an aggressive response to 9/11. For example, the
Bush Administration has announced policies whereby American citizens as
well as foreign nationals are detained indefinitely and subjected to irregular
military proceedings because of suspected terrorist activities. 159 Its Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) has claimed that executive branch officials are
immune from accountability for violating federal statutory and treaty rules
making torture a crime. 1
60
Article II vests all "executive" power with the President and makes him
Commander in Chief of the armed forces.16 1 From this structure and from
historical practice, the Bush Administration maintains that it has plenary
power to conduct (some) antiterrorist activities without congressional or
judicial interference. Like the First and Fourteenth Amendments, Article II
is open ended and therefore does not foreclose the Administration's
interpretation. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, however, the Supreme Court rejected
such a broad reading of Article II and ruled that citizens suspected of
159. E.g., Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834, 57,833-34 (Nov. 16,
2001) (creating military commissions with exclusive jurisdiction to try foreign nationals for any
prior or future "acts of international terrorism").
160. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf. But see Memorandum from Daniel Levin,
Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf (superseding and largely repudiating the
earlier memorandum).
161. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (Vesting Clause); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (Commander-in-
Chief Clause).
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terrorism retain most of the liberties assured by the Bill of Rights.,62 A
pluralism-facilitating theory provides support for Hamdi, as well as for the
Court's ruling in Rasul v. Bush that suspected terrorists have access to
judicial review through the writ of habeas corpus.
163
Without qualification, the Fifth Amendment protects every "person"
against federal deprivation of liberty "without due process of law"; the
Sixth Amendment assurances of access to counsel, public trial, and
confrontation of witnesses are delivered to an "accused" person of any
citizenship; and the Eighth Amendment's bar on excessive bail is stated
without qualification. The plain text sets the constitutional baseline-"a
conservative bias against infringements of established standards of due
process, equal protection, and basic dignity"-in the war against terror.164
As a matter of constitutional text and tradition, the judiciary is the proper
branch to enforce these obligations, typically through the writ of habeas
corpus. 165
The Administration's actions pose risks to our multicultural-pluralist
democracy. Because most detained citizens have been Arab Americans and
noncitizen detentions have been overwhelmingly focused on people of Arab
descent or Muslim faith, there has been a dangerous element of ethnicity
targeting. The segregation (detention) of even a tiny percentage of Arab or
Muslim Americans risks raising the stakes of politics by fostering an us-
against-them attitude among this minority; this would also undermine the
long-term campaign against terrorism. 66 It may be a risk worth taking
when detention is short term and in response to an emergency, but Susan
Akram's reading of the Japanese-American detainment cases of World War
162. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); compare id. at 2635 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (rejecting
the Administration's broad interpretation of Article 1I), with id. at 2674 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(accepting the Administration's interpretation).
163. 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2692-93 (2004).
164. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 9
(2004).
165. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (holding that Congress, not the President, sets the terms for the
Great Writ); see also Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2660 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Ex parte Merryman, 17 F.
Cas. 144 (Taney, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (holding that the President cannot
suspend the Great Writ).
166. As David Cole explains,
If authorities have reason to believe that there might be potential terrorists lurking in
the Arab immigrant community, they would do better to work with the millions of law-
abiding members of that community to obtain their assistance in identifying potential
threats, than to alienate the community by treating many of its members as suspect
because of their ethnicity ....
David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 958 (2002); see also Laura A. Dickinson,
Using Legal Process To Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, International
Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1407 (2002); Jeremie J. Wattellier, Note,
Comparative Legal Responses to Terrorism: Lessons from Europe, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 397, 415-16 (2004) (concluding, from a survey of European experience, that punitive and
ethnically targeted policies are ineffective and undermine the government's overall legitimacy).
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II reminds us that even short-term detentions can raise the stakes and that
emergencies can create conditions allowing racist acting out.
167
The Court was (modestly) lowering the stakes in the 2003 Term's
terrorism cases. As a matter of symbolic inclusion, it was particularly
important for the Court to enforce the Great Writ. Habeas has traditionally
been a means by which members of unpopular groups, particularly racial
and ethnic minorities, have been able to voice objection to their
questionable incarceration. 68 Like African Americans before them, Arab
Americans need reassurance that the rule of law protects them, and Hamdi
and Rasul say that it does. Notwithstanding the OLC position, the judiciary
must also enforce antitorture laws against executive abuse of detained
persons. Indeed, Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez backed away from the
OLC position during his confirmation hearings in January 2005.
It was also important for the Court to reaffirm a primary role for
Congress in determining the procedures for dealing with enemy combatants
in the United States and at Guantnamo Bay. Pluralism-facilitating judicial
review ought to be skeptical of legislative attempts to "pass the buck" to the
Executive and of executive claims that the buck was in fact passed.
Important national decisions such as this one ought not be made without
input from all relevant groups. Congress is the organ of government that
best reflects our pluralist heterogeneity, and it is better situated than the
courts to carry out sober public debate on how to balance national security
and individual rights. It is generally harder for the political process to gang
up on unpopular minorities in the group-deliberative Congress than in the
fast-acting Presidency.
The Japanese-American detention cases of the 1940s suggest a further
strategy by which a cautious Court can balance pluralism and security. In
Ex parte Endo, the Court held that Congress had not authorized the armed
forces to detain Japanese Americans indefinitely in internment camps and
directed the government to release Mitsuye Endo. 169 Presuming that
Congress is "sensitive to and respectful of the liberties of the citizen," the
Court read the statute to impose "no greater restraint on the citizen than was
clearly and unmistakably indicated by the language they used., 170 Endo's
167. Susan Akram, The Aftermath of September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and
Muslims in America, 24 ARAB STUD. Q. 61 (2002) (arguing that post-9/l1 searches and detentions
have been driven by guidelines that target Arabs and Muslims); see also Nelson Lund, The
Conservative Case Against Racial Profiling in the War on Terrorism, 66 ALB. L. REV. 329
(2003).
168. See ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CoRpus: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY
(2001) (demonstrating that the Court's expansion of habeas remedies in the mid-twentieth century
was responsive to unfair treatment of black defendants in the South).
169. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
170. Id. at 300.
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clear-statement rule assures pluralist input, because the President is on
notice that he cannot detain people based on a general authorization and
must prompt Congress to deliberate on the matter. This reassures ethnic
minorities that their freedoms will not be lightly sacrificed. Though the
Hamdi Court did not cite Endo, it found sufficiently targeted congressional
authorization for detention of Taliban allies under some circumstances.
1 7'
This is an inquiry that should prove more critical in some future cases,
because it allows judges to offer the political process-and the branch with
primary authority under the Constitution's text and structure-an
opportunity to lower the stakes of security measures, or not.
B. Language Minorities and the Constitution
The United States has always been a nation where English is the
operative language but others are spoken. The growth of our Latino
population (now almost 14% of all Americans and projected to reach 20%
by 2020) has made this phenomenon particularly important. About 77% of
Latinos in America speak Spanish, and half of Spanish speakers do not
speak English.1 72 The percentage of bilingual or non-English-speaking
Americans will rise in the next generation. This fluid group of Americans
has already begun to assert statutory and constitutional challenges to state
discriminations against them.
A pluralism-facilitating approach urges judges to understand the First
and Fourteenth Amendments from the perspective of language minorities
and to lower the stakes of language politics that can be expected to flare up
more often in the next generation. Language is constitutive of identity. As
Cristina Rodriguez argues, language not only marks an important trait that
can be a salient marker of cultural difference or commonality but is also the
prism through which we understand as well as articulate the world around
US.
173
171. Congress authorized the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force" against
those involved in the September 11 attacks. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No.
107-40, 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. (115 Stat.) 224, 224 (2001). Hamdi ruled that this statute authorized
short-term detention of suspected "enemy combatants" involved in the war against al Qaeda and
the Taliban. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639-41 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at 2679
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (agreeing on this point). Justices Scalia and Souter criticized the Court's
willingness to find a congressional authorization in such open-ended language. Id. at 2656-57
(Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment); id. at 2671-72
(Scalia, J., dissenting). A pluralism-facilitating theory would support their skepticism but would
also emphasize that Justice O'Connor only found authorization for short-term-and not
indefinite-detention.
172. Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural
Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 359-60 & n.498 (1992).
173. Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language and Participation (Summer 2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). For an excellent introduction to the constitutional dimensions of
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In areas where English-speaking majorities feel threatened by bilingual
or non-English-speaking minorities, the majorities may seek to exclude or
segregate the minorities. Congress has imposed statutory obligations on
governments to accommodate linguistic minorities in the schools and the
voting booth. 174 A pluralism-facilitating theory suggests there is a
constitutional dimension to this statutory principle.1 75 For this reason, such
statutes should be liberally construed and vigorously enforced.
A more common response is assimilative. Indeed, language is at the
center of a politics of assimilation in much of this country. At least twenty-
seven states have enacted some type of English-only law. 176 Most of the
laws declare English the "official" language of the state without imposing
specific legal rules to implement this symbolism. 177 These laws are, for the
most part, constitutionally passable. A few have imposed pro-English
requirements on private schools or businesses. These laws are
constitutionally questionable.' 78 As a formal matter, such laws present due
process and free speech problems, because they deny people their freedom
to speak in the language they choose; this is a fundamental, even primordial
liberty even without the speech feature. To the extent such English-only
rules are motivated by ethnic prejudice or stereotyping, they are vulnerable
for equal protection reasons. As a functional matter, these laws also raise
the stakes of politics. Spanish-speaking and bilingual citizens can
reasonably see English-only regulations as marking them as an out-group,
required to conform to majority language conventions that have an
exclusionary effect not imposed on other groups. Some of the regulations
can reasonably be interpreted as expressions of prejudice or stereotypes.
language politics, see Cristina M. Rodriguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Toward a
Comprehensive Theory of Language Rights in the United States, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133
(2001).
174. 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (2000) (schools); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(f)(1), 1973aa-la(b) (2000)
(voting).
175. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), invalidated Texas's exclusion of the children of
illegal aliens from its public school system. This decision was not dictated by the Court's
traditional reservation of strict scrutiny to laws deploying suspect classifications or denying
fundamental rights, but is a classic example of the pluralism-facilitating perspective: The Justices
were concerned not only that the Texas policy penalized "innocent children," id. at 230, but most
centrally that it put them at a "permanent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage," id. at
234 (Blackmun, J., concurring), a recipe for social strife.
176. Dennis Baron, Op-Ed, No Translation Needed: 'Door Is Closed,' L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2004, at M5.
177. ACLU, ENGLISH ONLY (1996); Crystal Goodson Wilkerson, Comment, Patriotism or
Prejudice: Alabama's Official English Amendment, 34 CUMB. L. REv. 253, 258-59 (2004).
178. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a statute barring foreign-
language instruction in public schools); Asian Am. Bus. Group v. City of Pomona, 716 F. Supp.
1328 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (striking down a requirement that commercial establishments dedicate half
of their sign space to English-language signs).
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Most such laws strongly undermine the neutrality of the state from the
perspective of disparaged language minorities.
Other states have adopted measures requiring state services to be
rendered in English alone. The Arizona Constitution says, "As the official
language of this State, the English language is the language of the ballot,
the public schools and all government functions and actions."'' 79 Such
provisions affect the day-to-day interaction between language minorities
and the state. On the one hand, they require assimilation, whereby bilingual
minorities must always give up their "other" language in dealing with the
state. On the other hand, they have an exclusionary effect for persons who
do not speak English proficiently; monolingual minorities lack effective
access to state officials. Both forced assimilation and effective exclusion
drive wedges between language minorities and the state, as well as their
fellow citizens.
These are pluralism-facilitating reasons, if any are needed, to apply the
First Amendment aggressively. As the Ninth Circuit held in Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English, the state should be acting in precisely the
opposite manner-encouraging language minorities to bring their
grievances and aspirations to state officials.1 80 Judge Kozinski, himself a
convert to English, responded that the state ought to have discretion to
require conformity in order to inculcate a common language and, implicitly,
a common culture.' 81 I am not sure he is wrong, though state-imposed
language conformity is coerced speech that violates the plain meaning of
the First Amendment as well as its pluralism-facilitating goal. And there are
gentler ways for the state to promote a common language than the blunt
instrument chosen by Arizona.
Kozinski's point is more cogent in the context of schools. The Arizona
provision allowed other languages as part of an educational program to
train schoolchildren in English. 182 Courts should be chary of becoming
involved in thorny substantive debates over the appropriate form of English
instruction in public schools. While many educators and other citizens
believe that bilingual education (instruction in both languages) is the best
approach, others believe that immersion in English is preferable. Unless one
program is chosen for the purpose of demeaning language-minority
179. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 1, cl. 2 (invalidated 1998).
180. 69 F.3d 920, 923, 936-37, 940-41 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997). The Arizona Supreme
Court struck down the law in Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (1998) (en banc).
181. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 960-63 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
182. Arizona allowed the use of other languages "[t]o assist students who are not proficient in
the English language, to the extent necessary to comply with federal law, by giving educational
instruction in a language other than English to provide as rapid as possible a transition to
English." ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 3, cl. 2(a) (invalidated 1998).
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students, this is an area where judges have little to contribute. Intervention
without a sophisticated understanding of educational theory in this unsettled
area runs the risk of raising the stakes of politics, quite unnecessarily.
C. Same-Sex Marriage
As a matter of formal equal protection doctrine, one can argue that state
bars to same-sex marriage constitute unconstitutional discrimination.
183
This is not just technical discrimination against lesbian and gay couples but
the denial of hundreds of state benefits and rights and, arguably, a deep
denial of equal citizenship. And the discrimination is held in place by
antigay prejudice and stereotypes that impede gay people's efforts to
achieve state recognition. For these reasons, Ely's representation-
reinforcing approach strengthens the formal case for judicial intervention. 1
84
Expansively applying a state equal rights amendment for these Elysian
reasons, the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin ruled that the same-
sex marriage bar is sex discrimination that must be strictly examined under
the Hawaii Constitution. 185 We the People responded immediately and
negatively to this exercise in perfecting democracy. Baehr generated a
constitutional train wreck. Moderates joined outraged traditionalists all over
the country in opposing same-sex marriage. Dozens of states adopted laws
refusing to recognize same-sex marriages. Congress by huge margins
adopted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which assured those states
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause would not require them to recognize
same-sex marriages and provided that more than 1000 federal laws and
regulations using the terms "spouse" or "marriage" will never be applied to
same-sex couples 186 (a degree of linguistic conformism unprecedented in
the U.S. Code). After a vitriolic campaign, tolerant Hawaiians voted 70%-
29% to amend their state constitution to allow the legislature to bar same-
sex marriages. 187 The Hawaii Supreme Court meekly dismissed the same-
sex marriage lawsuit,'88 leaving gay people feeling as disenfranchised as
traditionalists had felt right after Baehr.
183. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CMLIZED COMMITMENT 123-82 (1996); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS
QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW (2002).
184. I am assuming that one rejects or does not find applicable Ely's own caveat that the state
can deny same-sex marriage on grounds of traditional morality and not antigay animus. As noted
above, this is a substantive judgment.
185. 852 P.2d44 (Haw. 1993).
186. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2419
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).
187. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF
GAY RIGHTS 22-42 (2002).
188. Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (mem.).
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The Hawaii experience suggests why a pluralism-facilitating approach
would counsel much greater judicial caution on this issue, because
primordial loyalties are so deeply implicated on both sides of this still-
intense culture war. Many gay people view same-sex marriage as essential
to their equal citizenship, while many traditionalists view it as an
abrogation of theirs. Under these circumstances, a final pronouncement by
the U.S. Supreme Court requiring nationwide recognition of same-sex
marriage would repeat the error of Roe v. Wade. It would not only toss
down a gauntlet to many religious Americans, but would also foster antigay
sentiment supporting a constitutional amendment banning same-sex
marriage. On the other hand, a decision dismissing same-sex marriage
claims as "at best, facetious,' 189 in light of the longstanding definition of
marriage as one man and one woman would repeat the error of Bowers v.
Hardwick. It would signal to LGBT Americans and their increasing array of
allies that tradition can justify marriage-based discriminations against them
that would provoke pious judicial outrage if applied against different-race
couples, people with disabilities, or even convicted prisoners.
Is there any way for the judiciary to avoid the Scylla of Roe and the
Charybdis of Bowers on this issue? The Vermont Supreme Court did so in
Baker v. State,190 an opinion that reflects a pluralism-facilitating approach
to judicial review. As in Baehr, the Baker plaintiffs were lesbian and gay
couples using the state constitution's equality guarantee to challenge the
state's same-sex marriage bar. The court ruled that the state was acting
unconstitutionally in discriminating against lesbian and gay couples. Rather
than directing an immediate remedy, however, the court remanded the
matter to the legislature. The intended effect of the remand was to reverse
the burden of inertia: Same-sex marriage was forced onto the legislative
agenda with the burden shifted to traditionalists to justify doing little or
nothing to recognize lesbian and gay families. In early 2000, the Vermont
legislature agonized over the normative and practical issues and enacted a
law reaffirming marriage as between one man and one woman, but also
creating civil unions, separate from marriage but accorded all the legal
benefits and duties that Vermont conferred on married (different-sex)
couples. The stakes of this political debate were high, but the process
lowered them somewhat. Through public hearings and one-on-one
conversations, the legislators listened attentively to all groups and made a
189. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
190. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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genuine effort to accommodate the deepest normative needs of their
different constituents. 191
If Baehr was a disaster and Baker a relative success, was the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court wrong to require same-sex marriage
licenses six months after announcing its decision in Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health?192 From a pluralism-facilitating perspective,
Goodridge raised the stakes of politics in the short term, and it might well
have been better for the court to have followed Baker. The counterargument
is that Massachusetts in 2004 was "ready" for same-sex marriage in ways
that Vermont in 2000 was not-in part because of what Vermont had done.
Thousands of same-sex couples joined in civil unions there, and even many
traditionalists accepted these new legal families.' 93 Traditionalists' cries of
wolf went unrealized, which surely prepared the way for a more receptive
climate in Massachusetts.
If the people of Massachusetts accept the result in Goodridge, should
the U.S. Supreme Court then invalidate DOMA and state nonrecognition
statutes? As a formal matter, they are constitutionally vulnerable, but a
pluralism-facilitating theory would urge that the Supreme Court say as little
as possible for as long as possible. The United States is not Massachusetts
and Vermont. In those states LGBT people are accepted as normal citizens
by most of their neighbors-and that degree of acceptance was necessary
for judges in those states to insist on homo equality. In most other states,
much of the public still considers gay people disgusting or, at best, misfits.
Under such circumstances, it would be a mistake of Roe-like proportions
for the Supreme Court to make Goodridge or even Baker the law of the
land in 2005. And it would be a mistake of Bowers-like proportions to
definitively rule that the state owes no equality obligations to lesbian and
gay couples.
Scylla and Charybdis, therefore, threaten the Supreme Court. The
Justices' salvation, from a pluralism-facilitating point of view, is
federalism. 194 In the short term, different states will reach different
accommodations on this issue. States in the Northeast and the West Coast
are likely to recognize same-sex unions of some sort, either as a matter of
their own law or through recognition of out-of-state marriages or unions.
191. ESKRIDGE, supra note 187, at 57-82 (providing an account of the legislative
deliberations leading to the civil union law).
192. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
193. E.g., Nancy Remsen, Call for Ban on Gay Marriage Stirs Up Memories of Vt. Debate,
BURLINGTON (Vt.) FREE PRESS, Feb. 29, 2004, at IA.
194. The Establishment Clause was originally a federalism guarantee. It barred a national
establishment of religion but assertedly allowed statewide establishments: One state could
promote Religion X, and the next could promote Religion Y. See GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-
STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 13-20, 113-14 (1987).
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States in the South, the Great Plains, and the Rocky Mountains are unlikely
to recognize same-sex unions. States in the Midwest may recognize out-of-
state marriages or unions or, later, create their own institutions. For the time
being, this is fine. First, it allows states or regions to sort out a divisive
issue in ways most congenial to their own balance of opinion and identity
investment. If the more liberal blue states can recognize same-sex civil
unions or marriages and traditionalist red states can refuse, a large majority
of Americans will feel validated by their state's choice. Second, federalism
gives the nation a safety valve, because the minority group in each state can
vote with their feet. LGBT people who feel disrespected by Oklahoma's
refusal to recognize their unions can move to Massachusetts. Devout
traditionalists who feel disrespected by Massachusetts's recognition of what
they consider "unnatural" unions can move to Oklahoma.
The first two reasons do present one risk: The nation may become even
more polarized-the blue states bluer and the red states redder. This would
be a big pluralism problem, but it will probably be ameliorated by a third
virtue of federalism: It creates laboratories of experimentation and new
opportunities for the falsification of stereotypes. Gay rights advocates say
that marriage will encourage lesbian and gay family formation and be good
for children reared in such households. Traditionalists say that lesbian and
gay marriages will be bad for children and will destroy marriage as an
institution. Well, same-sex marriage is now on trial in Massachusetts. That
state's experience will provide useful information.
CONCLUSION
Ely's representation-reinforcing project was to draw from the
Constitution principles for perfecting democracy. This article's pluralism-
facilitating project draws from theories of democratic pluralism principles
for perfecting the Constitution. Some corollaries of my theory are that
constitutional "change" ought to come slowly and with input from
legislators, administrators, and voters; that the efficacy of judicial review
depends on its pluralist prudence more than its originalist pedigree; and that
constitutional change cannot come from judges alone.
The same-sex marriage cases illustrate all these features. Decisions like
Goodridge and Baker would have been neither possible nor advisable in a
state whose public policies did not already signal acceptance of LGBT
people as worthy citizens. The legislatures in both Massachusetts and
Vermont had enacted sweeping laws barring discrimination against gay
people (the Massachusetts antidiscrimination law was the one struck down
as applied in Hurley). Both states offered same-sex domestic partnership
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benefits to state employees. Lesbian and gay families were flourishing in
both states before marriage lawsuits were even filed.
Yet the Vermont justices were right to move slowly in Baker, and the
Massachusetts justices were taking a bigger risk in Goodridge. One feature
of both state constitutions made their risk taking more acceptable from a
pluralist perspective. The Vermont and Massachusetts Constitutions can be
amended by simple majority votes of two successive sessions of the
legislature and then by popular referendum. Thus, same-sex marriage has
not been taken out of politics even by Goodridge. In April 2004, the
Massachusetts legislature took the first step toward amending the
constitution to limit marriage to different-sex couples, with civil unions for
same-sex couples. This is democratic pluralism in action: The court
reversed the burden of inertia, but not in such a way that the political
process was powerless to debate it meaningfully.
This constitutional structure is in striking contrast to the clunky process
of Article V, which requires two-thirds majorities in each chamber of
Congress and ratification by three-quarters of the states. A 2005 U.S.
Supreme Court decision requiring same-sex marriage across America
would create three kinds of intense anger: Traditionalists would be furious
that gay marriage was a constitutional right; most Americans would be
unhappy that an important policy issue had been resolved by unelected
Justices; and both groups would be tremendously frustrated by a
constitutional amendment process that got stuck on state number thirty-
six.' 95 This kind of result would be a pluralism nightmare.
In contrast to Ely's representation reinforcement approach, a pluralism-
facilitating perspective helps us evaluate mechanisms for constitutional
change. The elaborate Article V process makes such change too difficult,
thereby depriving Americans of a mechanism for responding to Supreme
Court mistakes like Roe v. Wade. We should amend Article V to reduce the
ability of one group or one region to veto constitutional change. My own
inclination would be to adopt the amendment process of the Massachusetts
and Vermont Constitutions. If this renders constitutional amendment too
easy, the gentle reader might consider retaining a less onerous
supermajority requirement, perhaps something like a three-fifths vote by
each chamber of two successive Congresses, followed by a national
referendum, also requiring a three-fifths majority of votes cast.
195. This could happen to a federal gay marriage amendment, just as it happened to the ERA.
(Any thirteen of the sixteen states of the Northeast and Pacific Rim could defeat a gay marriage
amendment. Nor is it an Article V "gimme" that all of the Great Lakes and Midwest states would
ratify.) The ERA's narrow defeat, of course, was softened by the Supreme Court's substantial
absorption of its principle into the Equal Protection Clause.
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